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SEARCHING FOR FAIR HOUSING
Lee Anne Fennell*
There is a blind spot in the scholarly and legal treatment of housing
discrimination: the racial biases of homeseekers. Search strategies
routinely incorporate information about neighborhood racial
composition, either as a proxy or as a direct preference. Although
search heuristics can powerfully entrench and perpetuate (or,
alternatively, disrupt) segregation, it is widely assumed that the way
that families search for homes is none of the law’s business. This
paper questions that assumption and, more broadly, examines how
homeseeking fits into a societal conception of fair housing that
assigns positive value to integration.
INTRODUCTION
Private discrimination against homeseekers based on race has been
illegal in the United States since 1968.1 But discrimination on the part of
homeseekers has received no parallel regulatory or legislative attention.2
Rather, it is generally assumed that a househunter has every legal right to
enter or avoid a community for any reason she likes, including its racial or
ethnic composition.3 On the surface, this asymmetry fits neatly with
*
Max Pam Professor of Law and Ronald H. Coase Research Scholar, University of Chicago Law School. I
thank Bernadette Atuahene, Vicki Been, Rob Breymaier, Hanoch Dagan, Nestor Davidson, Christopher Fennell,
Ingrid Gould Ellen, William Fischel, Jamila Jefferson, Eduardo Peñalver, John Rappaport, Daria Roithmayr,
Carol Rose, Stacy Seicshnaydre, Robert Schwemm, Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Lior Strahilevitz, Noah Zatz, and
participants in the 2016 Property Works in Progress Workshop and in faculty workshops at MIT’s Department of
Urban Studies and Planning and at the University of Chicago Law School for helpful comments and
conversations. Research support from the Stuart C. and JoAnn Nathan and Harold J. Green Faculty Funds and the
SNR Denton Fund is also gratefully acknowledged.
1
The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., was enacted in 1968. A 1968 Supreme Court decision also
recognized that Section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 bans private racial discrimination in property
transactions. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). The Fair Housing Act currently reaches
discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin, sex, familial status, and disability—but race will be
my focus here.
2
I argue that certain forms of discriminatory homeseeking could in fact be reached through existing law.
See infra Part III. But the prevailing view of the law’s coverage is very much to the contrary.
3
See, e.g., Stacy Seicshnaydre, The Fair Housing Choice Myth, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 967, 987 (2012)
(describing as “perfectly legal” the diminution in housing choice that comes “in the form of a majority-group
member’s consumer choice to opt out of inclusion”); John Charles Boger, Toward Ending Residential
Segregation: A Fair Share Proposal for the Next Reconstruction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1573, 1579 (1993) (explaining
that efforts at integration would be thwarted, even if illegal conduct were addressed, by whites’ “perfectly legal
housing choices that, cumulatively, would lead to segregated neighborhoods”); Xavier de Souza Briggs, Politics
and Policy: Changing the Geography of Opportunity, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY 310, 314-15 (Xavier
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antidiscrimination law’s focus on unblocking access to housing
opportunities.4 Yet as Thomas Schelling’s work made clear decades ago,
individual location choices can have a profound, cumulative impact on
overall housing patterns and hence on available housing choices.5 And the
role that neighborhood racial composition continues to play in the home
selection decisions of white households, whether as a proxy or as a direct
preference,6 remains a chief driver of segregation.7
It is, therefore, something of a puzzle why antidiscrimination law, and
legal scholarship devoted to the topic, have largely ignored homeseeking.8
The puzzle deepens when we consider the Fair Housing Act’s goal of
promoting integration—a goal that would seem to require either addressing
segregative household choices or counteracting them in some way. In this
paper, I take on this understudied and undertheorized issue. I critically
examine presumed normative and doctrinal impediments to addressing
homeseeker discrimination, and consider how the law’s treatment of this
form of bias connects conceptually to the project of delivering fair housing.
My analysis challenges two claims on which there appears to be
overwhelming legal and scholarly consensus: that the law does not and
should not reach discriminatory housing search.9 Contrary to all prior
de Souza Briggs & William Julius Wilson, eds., 2005) (“[S]egregation stems not only from illegal acts of
discrimination, but also from perfectly legal, if segregative, choices” including “‘self-steering’ by whites and
minorities”).
4
See Seicshnaydre, supra note 3, at 981 (“The [Fair Housing Act] protects the choices of the housing
consumer in a marketplace in which the housing provider stands as gatekeeper.”).
5
See, e.g., THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 147-66 (1978); see also DARIA
ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM 93-120 (2014).
6
See, e.g., INGRID GOULD ELLEN, SHARING AMERICA’S NEIGHBORHOODS 49 (2000) (discussing whites’ use
of “race as a proxy”); see also infra Part I.A.2.
7
See, e.g., Lance Freeman & Tiancheng Cai, White Entry Into Black Neighborhoods: Advent of a New Era?
660 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 302, 302 (2015) (“While there is considerable debate about the causes
of the spatial isolation of blacks, on one reason there is near unanimity—whites’ avoidance of black
neighborhoods.”).
8
Seicshnaydre, supra note 3, has the most detailed legal analysis of the issue of which I am aware. See id. at
999-1004. Most analysts ignore the issue as both a doctrinal and theoretical matter. See, e.g., TARUNABH
KHAITAN, A THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 200 (2015) (noting antidiscrimination law’s asymmetrical
application to some actors and not others and expressing surprise “that most discrimination law theorists ignore
this ostensibly bizarre set-up”). Scholars in other disciplines have explored the dynamics of housing search and
choice in considerable detail but have not focused on regulating homeseeking. See infra Part I.A. A growing
literature has begun to address other discriminatory consumer choices. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett and G. Mitu
Gulati, Discrimination by Customers (2016) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2540334;
Heather Whitney, The Autonomy Defense of Private Discrimination, working paper 2016 (on file with author);
Kimani Paul-Emile, Patients’ Racial Preferences and the Medical Culture of Accommodation, 60 UCLA L. REV.
462 (2012); Michael Blake, The Discriminating Shopper, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1017 (2006); see also Saul
Levmore, Title VII to Tinder: Law’s Asymmetry and (Occasional) Market Superiority, working paper 2016 (on
file with author). Cf. Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents of Sex and
Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1400-01 (2009).
9
This is not to suggest that scholars are untroubled by homeseeker discrimination, nor that they have
systematically considered and rejected every means of reaching it. Rather, there is a general tendency in the
literature to view addressing homeseeking as a nonstarter for a number of overlapping reasons—doctrinal,
practical, and normative—and to bypass any nuanced exploration of these points. There has also been a tendency
to conflate two elements that this paper hopes to break apart—the search process itself, and the ultimate decision
about where to live. The assumption that regulating the former implies regulating the latter likely underpins much
of the current apparent consensus that homeseeking is untouchable.
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analyses of which I am aware, I argue that at least some manifestations of
homeseeker bias can be a normatively appropriate target of fair housing
law.10 I also argue, contrary to the prevailing wisdom, that existing law can
be fairly read to offer tools for addressing certain forms of homeseeker
bias.11 There are indeed significant normative and doctrinal limits on the
scope of liability that can attach to housing search. But giving homeseekers
a free pass to discriminate is not the benign, overdetermined move that it is
generally thought to be.
Recognizing the correlative relationship between rights and duties
identified by Wesley Hohfeld12 helps to illuminate what is at stake.
Safeguarding the rights of households to fair housing opportunities requires
distributing corresponding fair housing duties (in some manner) throughout
society. The fewer the agents who are considered appropriate bearers of
those duties, the greater the duties must be on some or all of the remaining
agents—or the more constrained must be the fair housing rights. Thus,
keeping homeseekers off the roster of parties who are held to account for
intentional racial discrimination13 requires shifting the costs associated with
that discrimination somewhere else—either back onto members of minority
groups who see their rights to fair housing accordingly curtailed, or onto
other parties who are in a position to overcome or compensate for the
effects of biased home search.14
The paper proceeds in four parts. Parts I and II challenge the dominant
view that racially restrictive housing search should be deemed normatively
off-limits as a domain for legal intervention.15 These Parts address,
respectively, two primary rationales for ignoring search practices—that
homeseekers cannot materially influence fair housing opportunities, and
that any effort to address search would be an impermissible intrusion into
autonomy and related values.16 Part I examines the empirical effects of
10

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
12
WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING
AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 36-42 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923).
13
Of course, some race-based search behaviors are unconscious or implicit in nature, see infra notes 49, 181.
Under existing doctrinal categories, these count as “intentional” forms of race-based decisionmaking and are
treated as such here. This does not imply that all are equally culpable. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id,
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 29 STAN. L. REV. 317, 325-26 (1987)
(“Understanding the cultural source of our racism obviates the need for fault, as traditionally conceived, without
denying our collective responsibility for racism’s eradication.”).
14
See infra Part I.B; see also infra Part IV (describing some ways in which costs might be shifted).
15
I use the term “racially restrictive” here to denote segregative forms of race-consciousness. My use of the
terms race-based, biased, and discriminatory as modifiers for search carry the same meaning and are likewise
meant to exclude race-consciousness directed at integrative ends.
16
These rationales track the factors that Tarunabh Khaitan recently elaborated in discussing the law’s choice
to extend nondiscrimination duties only to certain actors and not others. See KHAITAN, supra note 8, at 200
(suggesting the law chooses duty bearers based on two factors: the extent to which the duty intrudes into the
actor’s “negative liberty,” and the efficacy of choosing that duty bearer (which “will depend on its ability to affect
another person’s access to the basic goods”)); see id. at 195-213 (using the law’s different treatment of landlords
and tenants as an example). In the case of discrimination by tenants, Khaitan suggests, the intrusion associated
11
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housing search bias on segregation and concludes that this bias significantly
interferes with fair housing opportunities. Unaddressed discrimination by
homeseekers thus produces a disconnect—which I term “the search gap”—
between the fair housing opportunities that the law aspires to provide and
the duties that the law imposes on parties not to discriminate in the housing
domain.17
Part II turns to questions of autonomy and associational privacy.
Although these normative considerations place important constraints on
legal interventions into search, I resist the blanket conclusion that every
form of intentional homeseeker discrimination must be immunized.
Following a pattern that can already be found in certain provisions of fair
housing law (most notably, in the incomplete exception from liability for
so-called “Mrs. Murphy” landlords),18 I sketch a conceptual approach that
would preserve a realm for ultimate decisional autonomy for homeseekers
while prohibiting the use of categorical exclusionary search tactics. This
same approach also offers a novel way to address fair housing issues in the
roommate context—an arena in which housing provision and homeseeking
often blur together.
I then move from the normative question of what the law should do to
the doctrinal question of what the law does (or can properly be read to do).
Part III shows how categorical discrimination by homeseekers might be
reached through existing legal limits on advertising and statements, as well
as through constraints on real estate agents, without infringing ultimate
decisional autonomy. Part IV considers the potential and limits of other
doctrinal hooks for addressing biased search or countering its effects.
Disparate impact analysis can reach third party conduct that interacts with
and exacerbates the biases of homeseekers. In addition, the Fair Housing
Act’s statutory mandate “affirmatively to further” fair housing19 supports
experimentation designed to counter biased search, from pattern-disrupting
homeseeking tools to strategies that encourage integrative moves.
This is an especially propitious moment for addressing these issues. In
June 2015, the Supreme Court held in Inclusive Communities that the Fair
Housing Act includes a disparate impact cause of action.20 That decision
also explicitly recognized integration as a continuing goal of the Act. 21 In
addition, HUD has recently breathed new life into the Fair Housing Act’s
with imposing a duty would be high and the efficacy would be low. See id. at 200, 212-13.
17
The search gap does not alone account for the disconnect between the goals of fair housing and the duties
imposed by law, of course, but rather forms a subset of a larger misalignment between the normative vision of fair
housing rights and the duties distributed to parties capable of bringing it about. See text accompanying note 116,
infra.
18
See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2)).
19
42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5); see also 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d).
20
135 S.Ct. 2507 (2015).
21
Inclusive Communities, 135 S.Ct. at 2525-26 (“The Court acknowledges the Fair Housing Act's continuing
role in moving the Nation toward a more integrated society.”).
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“affirmatively further” mandate, with a final rule issued in July 2015 that
directs localities and other entities receiving HUD funding to take a datadriven approach to meeting their obligations.22 Meanwhile, homebuyers are
becoming more directly involved in orchestrating their own searches, and
technological developments offer new threats and novel opportunities in the
search domain. In sum, it is becoming both increasingly feasible and
increasingly important to treat homeseeking as a fair housing issue.
Before beginning, some notes about scope and emphasis are in order.
Gaining traction on the neglected topic of housing search requires
analytically isolating racially biased homeseeking from many other issues
with which it is plainly entwined as an empirical matter: continuing
discrimination by housing providers; steering by realtors; public and private
land use controls that produce economic stratification, including restrictions
on the quantity and location of housing stock; affordable housing policy
decisions at all governmental levels; inequities in education and other local
goods and services; and many others. Biased search is by no means the only
obstacle to achieving fair housing. But it is an important and neglected
obstacle that can benefit from close conceptual and doctrinal analysis.
Unlike other impediments to fair housing, biased housing choice involves
conduct that is both overtly discriminatory and widely believed to lie
beyond the reach of law—a combination that warrants attention.
Because housing search represents an almost entirely unexplored policy
front, I will focus here on moving-in decisions rather than on moving-out
decisions. Although the two decisions obviously interact,23 homeseeking
appears to be the more foundational housing choice problem. Research
shows that the moving-in decision is more sensitive to neighborhood racial
composition than the decision to move out.24 Moreover, racially motivated
out-moves are implicitly premised on racially motivated in-moves. A family
would have no reason to leave an existing neighborhood based on its racial
composition unless it had identified another neighborhood to move into that
had a different composition. Even when out-moves are motivated by fears
of declining property values rather than racial composition as such, the
dynamic is driven by the anticipated racial biases of potential in-movers.25
22

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing,
Final Rule, 80 FED. REG. 42272 (July 16, 2015).
23
See, e.g., ELLEN, supra note 6, at 46.
24
See id. at 133 (citing survey data showing that “when confronted with a neighborhood that is one-third
black, 59 percent of white respondents in 1992 said they would be unwilling to move in, while only 29 percent
said they would try to move out”); see also id. at 50-51. Aside from inertia and switching costs, existing residents
have more information about their communities and thus a diminished need to rely on crude proxies like race. See
id. at 106; cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Privacy versus Antidiscrimination 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 363 (2008)
(explaining how more information about individuals can reduce decisionmakers’ reliance on racial and gender
proxies).
25
Put differently, white flight would not be sufficient to sustain segregation in the absence of white
avoidance. See Freeman & Cai, supra note 7, at 303 (“[W]hite avoidance, in addition to the oft-written-about
mechanisms of discrimination and white flight, would seem to also be a necessity for whites to maintain their
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Biased homeseeking has also proven to be a more durable segregative
force than neighborhood exit, and carries greater modern significance. The
phenomenon that Ingrid Gould Ellen has termed “white avoidance”—the
unwillingness of whites to move into neighborhoods that are already
populated by a substantial fraction of African-American households26—
replaced white flight as a dominant generator of segregation after the latter
ebbed in the 1970s.27 As Michael D.M. Bader and Siri Warkentien observe,
“the shift from active white flight to passive white avoidance marks a
significant change in the process of segregation.”28 It is one to which legal
scholars should attend.
Finally, as my reference to white avoidance suggests, I will concentrate
primarily on racial discrimination by whites against blacks.29 This limited
focus is not meant to suggest that other forms of discrimination are
nonexistent or unimportant, nor to deny that they interact with white
avoidance in important ways—some of which I will discuss. Rather, I wish
to direct attention to the type of homeseeker conduct that continues to be
most strongly implicated in the perpetuation of segregation.
I. IS HOMESEEKING HARMLESS?
Two broad rationales, singly or in combination, appear to explain most
of the academic and legal disinterest in addressing biased homeseeker
choices.30 The first, which I take up in this Part, is the idea that homeseekers
can do little harm through their discriminatory conduct because they lack
the power to materially influence fair housing opportunities.31 This is
simply untrue as an empirical matter, at least if one takes a view of fair
housing that recognizes entrenched segregation as harmful and assigns
positive value to advancing integration.32 Unaddressed discriminatory
spatial distance from blacks.”).
26
ELLEN, supra note 6, at 2-3.
27
See Michael D.M. Bader & Siri Warkentien, The Fragmented Evolution of Racial Integration since the
Civil Rights Movement, 3 SOCIOLOGICAL SCIENCE 135, 168 (2015).
28
Id.; see also Freeman & Cai, supra note 7, at 305 (“While discrimination and white flight, the other
instruments of segregation, fell out of favor or at least declined, white avoidance appears to have been a durable
mechanism through which segregation has persisted in urban America.”).
29
The persistence and prevalence of black-white residential segregation in the United States explains my
primary focus on those two groups in this piece, despite the obvious simplification that such a dichotomous focus
involves. See, e.g., CAMILLE ZUBRINSKY CHARLES, WON’T YOU BE MY NEIGHBOR? RACE, CLASS, AND
RESIDENCE IN LOS ANGELES 3 (2006) (noting the need to move beyond a black-white dichotomy).
30
See, e.g., KHAITAN, supra note 8 at 195-213.
31
I will take up the second claim, which is grounded in autonomy concerns, in Part II, infra.
32
Such an understanding is consistent with recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court and HUD, see
supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text, and it is the one I adopt for purposes of this paper. The harms of
segregation have been well documented. See, e.g., David Card & Jesse Rothstein, Racial Segregation and the
Black-White Test Score Gap, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 2158 (2007); David M. Cutler & Edward L. Glaeser, Are Ghettos
Good or Bad? 112 Q.J. ECON. 827 (1997); Justin Steil et al., Desvinculado y Desigual: Is Segregation Harmful to
Latinos? 660 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 57 (July 2015); see generally PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN
PLACE (2013); ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION (2010).
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homeseeking generates a gap between meaningful fair housing rights and
the duties that the law is thought to impose on parties in the housing
domain. Although there is more than one way to close this “search gap,” it
should not be ignored.
A. The Harms of Biased Search
Although discrimination against homeseekers based on race has been
illegal in the United States since 1968,33 residential segregation remains
high in many American cities.34 Standard explanations include economic
differences that correlate with race; continuing supply-side discrimination
(e.g., by landlords and realtors); and the preferences of those selecting
housing.35 Although the first two factors plainly contribute to segregation,
they are insufficient to explain existing patterns;36 homeseeker preferences
appear to play an independent role.37 Moreover, because housing choices
are iterative and interdependent, wealth disparities and discrimination in
housing access can be magnified and replicated through home selection
choices that take racial composition into account.38
In the sections below, I will explain how racial bias enters into housing
search protocols, clarify that it does more than merely proxy for race-neutral
variables, and discuss the impediments that it presents to the pursuit of fair
housing.
1. Search Heuristics and Racial Bias
White homeseekers, especially homebuyers, tend to avoid
neighborhoods with substantial African-American populations.39
33

See supra note 1.
There have been important declines in racial segregation over recent decades nationwide, but these
declines have been uneven across cities and regions, leaving segregation high in many cities such as Chicago. See
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Civil Rights in a Desegregating America, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1329, 1339-60 (2016)
(surveying the social science literature on segregation definitions and trends, and noting caveats).
35
See, e.g., Maria Krysan et al., Pathways to Residential Segregation, in CHOOSING HOMES, CHOOSING
SCHOOLS 27, 36 (Annette Lareau & Kimberly Goyette, eds., 2014).
36
See, e.g., Margery Austin Turner, Limits on Housing and Neighborhood Choice: Discrimination and
Segregation in U.S. Housing Markets, 41 INDIANA L. REV. 797, 813 (2008) (“[I]f households were distributed
across neighborhoods entirely on the basis of income rather than race or ethnicity, levels of segregation would be
dramatically lower.”); Freeman & Cai, supra note 7, at 302-03 (“Neither the discrimination faced by blacks
attempting to move into white neighborhoods nor white flight from neighborhoods into which blacks move will
necessarily result in the apartheid-like landscape that characterizes much of urban America without whites
concomitantly avoiding black neighborhoods”); see also SHARKEY, supra note 32, at 28 (noting that economic
differences do not explain the far higher percentages of black children—including those in middle- and upperincome families—who grow up in high-poverty neighborhoods, compared with white children).
37
See, e.g., Seicshnaydre, supra note 3 and sources cites therein; Maria Krysan et al., In the Eye of the
Beholder, 5 DU BOIS REV.: SOC. SCI RES. ON RACE 5 (2008).
38
See infra Part I.B.3 (examining these interactions); see also Krysan et al., supra note 35, at 39-47
(discussing how dynamic processes perpetuate segregation in ways not captured by examining individual
explanations in isolation).
39
Observed moving behavior and studies on preferences both support this conclusion. See, e.g., ELLEN,
34
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Neighborhood racial composition factors into the preferences of black
homeseekers as well, although to a much lesser extent and for reasons that
are often endogenous to perceived white racial preferences.40 Although little
research has addressed the question,41 it is not hard to imagine how
information about race might enter into the search process. Racial
composition is one of the easiest pieces of information to learn about
neighborhoods from publically available data, and it may be explicitly used
to pre-screen search areas—either as an overt desideratum or as a proxy for
neighborhood quality.42
Racial composition may also enter into search heuristics in more subtle
ways. The cognitive and time demands of the home search process make
some preliminary winnowing of neighborhoods inevitable.43 Consider the
role of word-of-mouth neighborhood recommendations (and warnings) that
house hunters receive from people in their familial, social, or employment
circles—that is, from nonrandom demographic samples of the local
population. Also suggestive are findings that people tend to be more
familiar with neighborhoods that are close to them and in which their own
race is overrepresented.44 If knowledge of a neighborhood is a prerequisite
to search within it, then the way in which familiarity is established becomes
important.45
Home search advice is likely to get boiled down to simple formulas,
such as invisible boundary lines that should not be crossed. As a rental
housing advisor in Oak Park recently observed, “[p]eople walk in with
mental maps and memories of stories they saw on a blog and rumors
they’ve once been told. Don’t live on the east side of Oak Park.”46
supra note 6, at 131-51 (reviewing literature); Robert J. Sampson and Patrick Sharkey, Neighborhood Selection
and the Social Reproduction of Concentrated Racial Inequality, 45 Demography 1, 25 (2008) (finding, in a study
tracing the flow of moves made by Chicago families, that “80% of whites transition into (or remain in)
neighborhoods that are predominantly white and nonpoor, whether inside or outside the city”); CHARLES, supra
note 29, at 125-30 (finding in an LA survey using the “showcard” method to elicit neighborhood racial
composition preferences that “fewer than one-fifth of whites ha[d] an ideal neighborhood that was over 20 percent
black”). In addition, a number of recent research designs move beyond stated preferences to attempt to isolate the
role of race in hypothetical decisionmaking. See, e.g., Michael Bader & Maria Krysan, Community Attraction and
Avoidance in Chicago: What’s Race Got to Do With It? 660 ANNALS ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 261, 275 (2015).
40
See infra Part I.B.2.
41
See Bader & Krysan, supra note 39, at 277 (observing that existing studies on revealed preferences “fail to
reveal how inequality seeps into the [search] process”).
42
See infra Part I.A.2
43
See Bader & Krysan, supra note 39, at 264.
44
See Maria Krysan & Michael D.M. Bader, Racial Blind Spots: Black-White-Latino Differences in
Community Knowledge, 56 SOC. PROBLEMS 677 (2009).
45
Friends and family may play a large role in establishing familiarity, entrenching the influence of past
segregation. See Bader & Krysan, supra note 39, at 278. Familiarity may even influence whether people perceive
a particular neighborhood as too far away to consider. See id. at 276 (relating study results showing that blacks
and whites had different perceptions of the proximity of different locales, and concluding that [d]ue to the ongoing
racial segregation of Chicago, what is proximate or too far is racialized”); see also EVIATAR ZERUBAVEL, THE
FINE LINE: MAKING DISTINCTIONS IN EVERYDAY LIFE 27 (1991) (observing that “distance is greatly affected by
mental processes such as lumping and splitting” and explaining that “we often inflate ‘distances’ across mental
divides and perceive them as greater than even longer distances within the same entity”).
46
Emily Badger, How Race Still Influences Where We Choose to Live, Wash. Post, Wonkblog, July 17, 2015
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Homebuyers may find it especially hard to ignore such bright-line
prescriptions even if they personally take them with a grain of salt, given
the likelihood that others—including the future homebuyers to whom they
will later wish to sell—will hear and heed the same rules. More broadly,
these and similar heuristics can fuel predictions about the future racial
composition of the neighborhood and trigger concerns about property
values and local services.47 The result can be an entrenched neighborhood
reputation that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.48
Of course, some househunters may simply visit prospective
neighborhoods and form impressions based on what they observe. Even this
alternative is deeply infused with racial overtones, however. Recent studies
have shown that when white participants evaluate neighborhoods shown in
video vignettes, an objectively identical neighborhood scene (people
walking down the street, working on cars, and so on) will be rated lower
when African-American people are visible in the scene than when only
white people are observed.49 Whether this discounting operates at a
conscious level or not, it suggests that even those househunters who are
open to visiting unknown neighborhoods as part of their housing search
may end up making racially biased housing choices.
Technological changes in the mechanics of search could also impact the
role that racial composition plays in location decisions. Online reviews of
neighborhoods are becoming more common50 and may increasingly
supplement or supplant other information sources. If those who post online
come from a broader mix of demographic backgrounds than the families,
friends, and business associates of homebuyers, the results could help to
break down existing path dependencies in housing choice. However, people
(quoting Kate Lindberg Vazquez, Oak Park Regional Housing Center).
47
See, e.g., ELLEN, supra note 6, at 135 (observing that “in the case of many whites, much of their
reluctance [to enter neighborhoods with substantial minority populations] stems from fears about the future
quality of services delivered in the neighborhood, rather than a simple dislike of non-whites”). Property values are
widely cited as a reason for race-based decisionmaking. See, e.g. id. at 109 (reporting on survey responses in
which “falling property values and rising crime” were the most common reasons provided by white respondents
for why they would leave a racially mixed area); see also infra Part IV.C.2 (discussing significance of
homeownership and prospects for stake-lowering).
48
See, e.g., ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING NEIGHBORHOOD
EFFECT 36 (2012) (explaining the role of “[n]eighborhood reputations” for disorder which can produce a
“reinforcing cycle” and observing that “[s]ocial perceptions of disorder actually had a larger effect on later
poverty levels than the inertial path dependence for which prior poverty serves as a direct proxy”); Boger, supra
note 3, at 1578 (explaining that beliefs about lower property values in integrated neighborhoods “tend to become
self-fulfilling prophesies”).
49
Maria Krysan et al., Does Race Matter in Neighborhood Preferences? Results from a Video Experiment,
115 AM. J. SOC. 527 (2009); Krysan et al., supra note 37.
50
See, e.g., Melanie Pinola, How Can I Quickly Find the Best Neighborhood(s) in Any City and the Best
Hangouts Therein? Lifehacker, May 10, 2012, http://lifehacker.com/5909195/how-can-i-quickly-find-the-bestneighborhoods-in-any-cityand-the-best-hangouts-therein?utm_expid=6686609067.e9PWeE2DSnKObFD7vNEoqg.0 (describing a variety of tools for assessing neighborhoods and accessing
reviews about them); Streetadvisor.com http://www.streetadvisor.com/ (site devoted to user reviews and ratings of
neighborhoods and streets); see also BlockAvenue, www.blockavenue.com (compiling information about areas
based on a number of measures and attributes and assigning a composite letter grade “BlockScore”).
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may resort to online guidance only after having made a first cut based on
information derived from word-of-mouth recommendations, personal
familiarity, or explicit screening based on racial composition. Moreover,
race-based stereotypes about particular areas may become reinforced and
amplified through repetition online.
The widespread availability of internet access through mobile devices
makes information easier to access and parse on the fly. New smartphone
apps can marshal data and recommend communities to users.51 For
example, Dwellr, developed by the U.S. Census Bureau, uses Census
Bureau data to match users with their preferred communities based on their
preferences—including whether they prefer a community mostly made up
of families with children.52 And at least one online interface, Zipwho.com,
allows users to directly filter locations based on racial composition (as well
as many other dimensions) by choosing demographic factors from
dropdown menus and specifying upper and lower percentage bounds.53
Racial bias might also work its way into other information tools used by
homeseekers. For example, concerns about racial bias plagued the nowwithdrawn crowdsourcing app SketchFactor, which aggregated user reports
about safety and “sketchiness” in DC neighborhoods.54 Studies showing
how racial bias can infect impressions about disorder and neighborhood
quality raise serious concerns about such reports.55 Even objective
information about safety can produce path dependence, as systematic
avoidance of an area renders it increasingly less safe.56
More complex predictive algorithms can be readily imagined that would
either explicitly or implicitly build in racial criteria. Consider, for example,
a fictitious app designed for households relocating to a new metropolitan
area—call it Tiebout2Go.57 Families type in the address of their current
51
See Michele Lerner, To Make It Home Sweet Home, There’s an App for That, WASH. POST, June 4, 2015,
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/theres-an-app-for-that/2015/06/03/62ebdb54-ede4-11e4-8abcd6aa3bad79dd_story.html.
52
Dwellr, U.S. Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/mobile/dwellr/.
53
Zipwho.com, http://zipwho.com/ (“The most fun you can legally have with ZIP codes”).
54
See, e.g., Andrew Marantz, When an App Is Called Racist, NEW YORKER, July 29, 2015,
http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/what-to-do-when-your-app-is-racist. A recent episode of the TV
series The Good Wife featured a similar algorithm-driven app that prompted claims of racial bias. CBS, The Good
Wife, Season 7, Episode 9 (aired Nov., 29, 2015).
55
See Krysan et al., supra note 49; Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbusch, Seeing Disorder:
Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of ‘Broken Windows,” 67 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 319 (2004).
56
See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 35-42 (1961) (noting the
importance of “eyes upon the street”). Such concerns were raised in connection with Microsoft’s “Pedestrian
Route Production” app, which (according to its patent application) contemplated a function capable of mapping
walking routes that would avoid “high crime” areas. U.S. Patent No. 20,090,157,302 [0035] (filed Dec. 14,
2007), available at http://appft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/srchnum.html (search “20090157302”); see also Allison
Keyes, This App was Made for Walking—But Is it Racist?, NPR.org (Jan. 25, 2012),
http://m.npr.org/story/145337346?url=/2012/01/25/145337346/this-app-was-madefor-walking-but-is-it-racist.
Another recently introduced walking app incorporates crime statistics. See Liz Camuti, Walkonomics: What
Makes the Best Route? The Dirt, July 23, 2015 https://dirt.asla.org/2015/07/23/walkonomics-what-makes-thebest-route/ (describing app that rates “walkability” based on several factors, including “fear of crime”).
57
Charles Tiebout is best known for his theory that (under certain strong assumptions) households will sort
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home, input a commuting range and a price bracket in the new area, and
receive a list of suitable homes within neighborhoods and local jurisdictions
that most closely resemble their current environment in terms of
demographics, incomes, occupations, aesthetics, political leanings, local
services, school quality, and proximity to local amenities.58 The software is
highly predictive of which homes and neighborhoods the user will like,
greatly expediting the matching process.59 Search costs fall, but so too do
the prospects for disrupting entrenched housing patterns, including those
involving racial composition.60
Such an app would operate like an especially powerful but less
transparent word-of-mouth recommendation. Here, instead of the consumer
receiving recommendations from those in her own circle of acquaintances,
she is effectively receiving the recommendation from herself, based on past
choices—even though those choices may have been made in constrained
choice settings or produced through similarly biased processes. The
capacity of such technologies to replicate and thereby entrench past choices
is worrisome.61 Similar concerns attached to earlier forms of “cluster
profiling” that were used to classify neighborhoods for homeseekers based

into communities that provide their preferred mix of services, amenities, and taxes, making the choice among
locations similar to an ordinary shopping experience. See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,
64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 422 (1956).
58
For discussion of past or existing tools making use of very similar approaches, see generally John T.
Metzger, Clustered Spaces: Racial Profiling in Real Estate Investment (2001), available at
http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/606_Clustered-Spaces. For example, the “Community Calculator Neighborhood
Locator” asked users to input the zip code from which they were moving along with the city or community to
which they were moving, and generated recommendations of demographically similar communities. Id. at 17-18,
36 fig. 2. This tool was the subject of legal challenges. Id. at 17; see also Isaac v. Norwest Mortgage, 2002 WL
1119854 (N.D. Tex.).
59
The related idea of using data to generate personalized default rules in various domains has received
recent scholarly attention. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 48-56 (2013); Ariel
Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV.
1417 (2014). If racial or other protected class data about the housing consumer herself were used as part of the
algorithm that determined which homes she was likely to prefer, legal prohibitions on steering would plainly kick
in—just as it does if a real estate agent makes such predictions herself based on her client’s race. For discussion
of some normative issues surrounding use of demographic data in formulating personalized default rules, see
Porat & Strahilevitz, supra, at 1461-67.
60
The potential for algorithmic approaches to replicate and perpetuate past discriminatory patterns has
received significant recent attention. See, e.g., Joshua Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017), draft at 31, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2765268 (observing that “algorithms that
include some type of machine learning can lead to discriminatory results if the algorithms are trained on historical
examples that reflect past prejudice or implicit bias”); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate
Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671, 682 (2016) (providing examples illustrating the concern that algorithms trained on
past hiring decisions will automate and reinforce past discrimination that might be embedded in those decisions);
Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm? 115 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), draft at 13, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2795203 (describing “viral discrimination” that can occur when algorithms reproduce
past discrimination). Cf. Sunstein, supra note 59, at 49-50 (noting that basing defaults on past choices may
eliminate opportunities for the kind of learning that occurs “as people encounter, entirely serendipitously,
activities and products that do not in any way reflect their past choices”).
61
Of course, predictive algorithms also endeavor to learn from their users, and could update preferences
over time. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 59, at 53 (making this point in the context of personalized default rules).
Algorithms that consciously build in a certain amount of random variation could overcome path dependence to
generate new learning. Kroll et al., supra note 60, at 36; see infra notes 266-271 and accompanying text.
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on demographic data.62
2. Proxies and Preferences
Race clearly matters when it comes to housing search. But how much of
the observed bias in homeseeking can be explained by the idea that racial
composition serves as a proxy for neutral variables relating to neighborhood
quality, such as safety, schools, and services? The question connects to two
potential lines of reasoning.63 First, if neighborhood racial composition
were a close proxy for neighborhood quality, then it might seem that
eradicating race from home selection decisions and replacing it with raceneutral factors would do little or nothing to address segregated patterns.
Second, if neighborhood racial composition were a poor proxy for
neighborhood quality, then it might seem that the provision of better
information and more useful proxies would solve the problem.
There is reason for skepticism about both propositions. Empirical work
suggests that that racial composition plays an independent role in home
selection decisions, producing different results than would be generated
based on objective neighborhood quality factors alone.64 Yet the capacity of
better information and tighter proxies to squeeze out the influence of race is
greatly limited by the interdependent nature of housing search.
Instructive on the first point are studies that use a factorial analysis to
isolate the effect of racial composition on hypothetical home purchase
decisions.65 One study published in 2001 asked white respondents in a
nationwide telephone survey to imagine they had two school-aged children
and were in the market for a new house.66 They were then asked to indicate
the likelihood they would buy a hypothetical house that otherwise met their
62

See Metzger, supra note 58.
It might also affect the normative assessment of the conduct. See, e.g., ELLEN, supra note 6, at 155;
ANDERSON, supra note 32, at 71. Note, however, that constitutional and statutory prohibitions on the use of racial
classifications to dispense differential treatment do not recognize any exception for instances in which race might
proxy (however accurately) for some other variable of legitimate interest. See, e.g., David Strauss, The Myth of
Colorblindness, 1986 S.Ct. Rev. 99, 106-13 (1986) (presenting hypotheticals involving accurate proxies to make
this point).
64
See infra notes 65-73 and accompanying text. The question is a tricky one to test for, however, and not all
researchers have reached the same conclusions. See Valerie A. Lewis et al., Who We’ll Live With: Neighborhood
Racial Composition Preferences of Whites, Blacks, and Latinos, 89 SOCIAL FORCES 1385, 1386 (2011) ( “The
debate over whether racial composition has an independent influence on neighborhood preferences remains
unsettled due to inherent limitations of data and methodology.”). Neither revealed location preferences nor
preference surveys offer an empirically crisp view of motivations, neighborhood quality is difficult to measure,
see id., and correlations between race and socioeconomic status complicate the picture. See, e.g., ELLEN, supra
note 6, at 6. For a discussion of methodological issues surrounding the analysis of residential choice, see
generally Elizabeth E. Bruch & Robert D. Mare, Methodological Issues in the Analysis of Residential Preferences,
Residential Mobility, and Neighborhood Change, 42 SOCIOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY 103 (2012).
65
An initial nationwide survey focusing on white preferences using this approach was Michael O. Emerson
et al., Does Race Matter in Explaining Residential Segregation? Exploring the Preferences of White Americans,
66 AM. SOC. REV. 922, 924-25 (2001). A later study employing the same approach focused on the Houston
metropolitan area and included the preferences of blacks and Latinos as well as whites. Lewis, supra note 64.
66
Emerson et al., supra note 65, at 924-27.
63
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requirements, after receiving (randomly generated) neighborhood
information along five dimensions: school quality, racial composition,
property value trends, the home’s value relative to those of others in the
neighborhood, and crime rate.67 The study found that “[b]lack neighborhood
composition . . . matters significantly, even after controlling for proxy
variables.”68 A more recent study using similar methodology in the Houston
metropolitan area likewise found that “white respondents were less likely to
say they would buy the house as the percentage of black residents in the
neighborhood increased, even after controlling for the proxy variables.”69
Another recent study in the Chicago area examined which, out of a set
of 41 real communities, respondents said they would “seriously consider” or
“never consider.”70 There, “[w]hites’ willingness to seriously consider
neighborhoods declined rapidly as the percent black and Latino increased,”
an effect that “existed even in the presence of controls that are thought to
explain differences in racial preferences” including “home values, school
scores, and crime rates.”71 Similarly, “[w]hites were more likely to avoid
communities as both the percentage of African Americans and Latinos
increased” and “[a]gain, these racial differences persisted after controlling
for neighborhood characteristics.”72
Although outright racial animus is one explanation for these results, it is
also possible that respondents are actually applying an implicit discount to
some of the other quality variables based on the racial composition,
reflecting their prior beliefs about correlations between neighborhood
quality and race.73 The fact that these beliefs are empirically faulty does not
keep them from exerting strong pressure on even hypothetical housing
purchase decisions. And the more frequently they do so, the more
reinforced and entrenched those faulty beliefs become. Finding ways to
shift reliance to underlying neighborhood quality measures rather than

67

Id. at 925-26.
Id. at 931. Whites became unlikely to purchase the home when the black percentage was above 15% and
became increasingly unlikely as it rose beyond that threshold. Id. at 932. The authors concluded “Our findings
suggest a low probability of whites moving to neighborhoods with anything but a token black population, even
after controlling for the reasons they typically give for avoiding residing with African Americans.” Id. The
effects were especially strong among respondents who had children under 18 in the home. Id. at 930.
69
Lewis et al., supra note 64, at 1398.
70
Bader & Krysan, supra note 39.
71
Id., at 275.
72
Id. at 275-76. Interestingly, “neither violent nor property crime rates had independent effects on whether a
community would be avoided.” Id. at 276.
73
Emerson et al., supra note 65, at 932-33 (discussing “the possibility that whites cannot or will not divorce
race from variables for which race serves as a proxy” and that they might, for example, “still think ‘higher crime’
even if told lower crime”). Such a possibility is buttressed by work showing that perceptions of crime in an area
are influenced by race, after controlling for actual crime levels. See Lincoln Quillian & Devah Pager, Black
Neighbors, Higher Crime? The Role of Racial Stereotypes in Evaluations of Neighborhood Crime, 107 AM. J.
SOC. 717, 718-19 (2001) (finding “that the percentage of a neighborhood’s black population, particularly the
percentage young black men, is significantly associated with perceptions of the severity of the neighborhood’s
crime problem” even after controlling for crime rates and other neighborhood characteristics).
68
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racial stereotypes could break this destructive feedback loop.74
This brings us to the second line of reasoning cited above. Could the
increasing richness and multidimensionality of data about places to live
reduce reliance on the crude proxy of race and thereby render homeseeking
less biased?75 The salutary effect of increased information in squeezing out
bad proxies has been suggested in other contexts, such as employment.76
Home selection decisions, however, differ in their deep interdependence.
Homebuyers in particular may feel they cannot switch to new proxies in the
absence of assurance that abandonment of racial proxies will be sufficiently
widespread. Unlike an employer who can achieve gains on her own by
selecting a tighter-fitting proxy for employee quality, a homeseeker benefits
from a better proxy for neighborhood quality (at least in the sense of
safeguarding property values) only if many others will also use similar
proxies in constructing their bids for homes.77
Consider in this connection recent work by economists Jungsuk Han
and Francesco Sangiorgi modeling information acquisition in “beauty
contest” situations: ones in which each player’s payoff depends not on
whether he chooses the most objectively “beautiful” candidate, but rather
whether he chooses the candidate that most others will deem to be the most
beautiful.78 Where the need to coordinate expectations with those of others
is greater than the desire to choose the best alternative on the merits, a
flawed but widely shared information source can become a focal point.79 As
Han and Sangiorgi explain, “[w]hen the coordination motive is sufficiently
strong, there exists an equilibrium in which all agents choose to focus on
the inferior information source.”80 Because home values have as their inputs
the proxies employed by numerous current and future homeseekers, racial
composition may be a focal and thus difficult-to-shake information source.
74
See, e.g., ROITHMAYR, supra note 5, at 57-68 (discussing the “snowballing” dynamic of positive feedback
loops, which operates to magnify initial advantages and disadvantages).
75
Cf. Strahilevitz, supra note 24 (examining the possibility that increased availability of information about
individuals could reduce statistical discrimination in hiring and other contexts).
76
For example, an employer who wishes to avoid hiring an ex-convict might make use of criminal records
rather than demographic statistical correlations in deciding who to hire. See id.. at 365-66.
77
See ANDERSON, supra note 32, at 71 (“Although the self-fulfilling prophecy could be avoided if whites
collectively refused to racially profile neighborhoods, any individual white who ignores the racial profile risks a
large personal loss in access to advantage for a negligible positive impact on the neighborhood’s access.”).
78
Jungsuk Han & Francesco Sangiorgi, Searching for Information, Sveriges Riksbank Research Paper No.
124 (May 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2635392. The beauty contest metaphor is from JOHN
MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 158 (1936) (analogizing
investment to a contest for choosing the prettiest faces, but one in which the winner is “the competitor whose
choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole”).
79
See Han & Sangiorgi, supra note 78, at 37 (finding “that agents may prefer an inferior information source
with less searchable information due to coordination motives”). Cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary
Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 VA. L. REV. 437, 444, 454-57 (2006) (discussing use of amenities
correlated with demographic characteristics as focal points in newly developed communities, where demographic
composition cannot yet be directly observed). On the use of focal points to solve coordination problems more
generally, see, e.g., RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW 22-56 (2015); THOMAS C.
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 53-80, 89-118 (1963).
80
Han & Sangiorgi, supra note 78, at 37.
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3. Search as an Impediment to Fair Housing
Biased homeseeking is not a benign phenomenon. Racially restrictive
search procedures impede fair housing opportunities in at least three
interlocking ways. First, by entrenching segregated patterns and
preferences, race-based househunting makes stable integrated choices
difficult to initiate, foster, and maintain.81 At a most basic level, existing
patterns define the choice sets that confront homeseekers; one cannot
choose an integrated neighborhood that does not exist.82 Recent scholarship
models how race-based homeseeking creates a self-perpetuating segregative
cycle that amplifies preexisting income inequalities:83 whites choose more
wealthy neighborhoods than they otherwise would in order to have more
same-race neighbors, and blacks accept less wealthy neighborhoods with
more same-race neighbors.84 The resulting dynamic fuels continuing racial
inequality, visiting significant harm on African Americans while producing
relatively small gains for whites.85
Second, biased homeseeking by white households produces price
premiums in white neighborhoods relative to homes in African-American
neighborhoods.86 Homes in white neighborhoods also appreciate at higher
81
SCHELLING, supra note 5, at 146 (“People who have to choose between polarized extremes—a white
neighborhood or a black . . . will often choose in the way that reproduces the polarization.”).
82
See Lincoln Quillian, A Comparison of Traditional and Discrete Choice Approaches to the Analysis of
Residential Mobility and Locational Attainment, 660 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 240, 243-44 (2015)
(observing that “[a] household cannot move to a neighborhood that does not exist” and explaining how the choice
set is fixed in advance of the individual household’s choice).
83
Alejandro Badel, A Racial Inequality Trap, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Res. Div. Working Paper
No. 2015-034A (2015), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2015/2015-034.pdf.
84
Id. at 3; see Elizabeth E. Bruch, How Population Structure Shapes Neighborhood Segregation, 119 AM. J.
SOC. 1221 (2014) (finding in a stylized simulation model that “when blacks are poorer, on average, than whites,
high-income blacks will live in poorer neighborhoods, on average, than their white counterparts” and observing
that “this pattern is also found in U.S. census data”); see also Quillian, supra note 82, at 255-56 (finding based on
conditional logit analysis “that the huge gap in the odds of moving into a poor neighborhood between whites and
blacks mostly reflects the fact that whites move into white neighborhoods and blacks move into black
neighborhoods, and there is a large average difference in poverty rates and income between white and black
neighborhoods”); John Eligon & Robert Gebeloff, Affluent and Black, and Still Trapped by Segregation, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 20, 2016, at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/21/us/milwaukee-segregation-wealthy-blackfamilies.html?_r=0 (“In many of America’s largest metropolitan areas, including New York, Chicago, and Los
Angeles, black families making $100,000 or more are more likely to live in poorer neighborhoods than even white
households making less than $25,000.”).
85
Badel, supra note 83, at 27 (“[E]ven though racial preferences are the engine of this inequality trap, racial
integration implies large welfare gains for black households and relatively small losses for white households.”).
86
See David M. Cutler, Edward L. Glaeser & Jacob L. Vigdor, The Rise and Decline of the American
Ghetto, 107 J. POLIT. ECON. 455, 486 (1999) (“By 1990 . . . whites pay more for equivalent housing than blacks in
more segregated metropolitan areas, suggesting that decentralized racism has replaced centralized racism as the
factor influencing residential location.”); John Yinger, Hedonic Estimates of Neighborhood Preferences, 44 PUB.
FIN. REV. 22, 44 (2016) (presenting findings based on hedonic regression models that, among other results,
“indicate that houses in all-white neighborhoods may have housing prices up to one-third higher than houses in
integrated neighborhoods, all else equal”); Casey J. Dawkins, Recent Evidence on the Continuing Causes of
Black-White Residential Segregation, 26 J. URB. AFF. 379, 389-90 (2004) (summarizing hedonic regression
studies, which suggest there is a premium associated with segregated white areas, although its magnitude may be
changing in certain areas); see also Patrick Bayer et al., A Dynamic Model of Demand for Houses and
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rates for a given level of housing stock and local amenities.87 As the
housing wealth that African Americans and whites accumulate over time
diverges as a result of this dynamic, African Americans are less able to
compete for homes in more affluent neighborhoods.88 Through this
mechanism, housing search decisions tighten the connection between race
and wealth, and thereby withdraw housing opportunities based on race.89
Third, race-based search procedures both motivate and facilitate housing
discrimination by those providing access to housing. Thus, landlords,
realtors, or developers may be incentivized to discriminate in order to
produce housing patterns that are pleasing to their target audiences.90 Biased
search can also make it easier for providers of housing to achieve
segregated results without resort to overt discrimination. For example,
housing providers may embed housing amenities that enable parties to more
easily self-select into segregation.91 The prevalence of racially biased
housing consumers can thus alter the mix of housing that is provided in the
marketplace as well as the degree of segregation that it exhibits.
B. Are There Countervailing Considerations?
One might concede that racially biased search can alter housing
opportunity sets and even generate certain kinds of disadvantage but deny
that it represents a phenomenon that, on balance, justifies intervention. On
the contrary, the argument might run, any effort to reduce racially restrictive
homeseeking will primarily work to the disadvantage of African-American
households by fueling gentrification and compromising their efforts to form
Neighborhoods, NBER Working Paper No. 17250 (2011) (finding a dynamic model produces lower estimates for
willingness to pay for same-race neighbors).
87
See, e.g., Chenoa Flippen, Unequal Returns to Housing Investments? A Study of Real Housing
Appreciation among Black, White, and Hispanic Households, 82 SOCIAL FORCES 1523, 1540 (2004) (reporting
results finding that “the negative effect on home appreciation of having a very large initial black population (i.e.,
greater than 65%) at the time of purchase remains statistically significant even after accounting for all other
factors that influence housing appreciation.”); Jacob S. Rugh et al., Race, Space, and Cumulative Disadvantage: A
Case Study of the Subprime Lending Collapse, 62 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 186, 195 (2015) (finding confirmation of
“the well-documented disparity in home appreciation rates by race and neighborhood racial composition” in data
showing that black borrowers saw smaller local home price gains between 2000 and the peak in 2006-07 than
white borrowers (139 percent versus 168 percent), yet the local home price losses that followed were deeper for
black borrowers than for white borrowers).
88
See ROITHMAYR, supra note 5, at 109. Segregation produces harms through other mechanisms as well,
many of which feed back into the ability to compete effectively for the housing of one’s choice. For example,
segregation in housing translates into shortfalls in educational and employment opportunities. See, e.g.,
ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION 23-43 (2010). Housing segregation also constrains
who people are likely to meet, date, and marry. See Emens, supra note 8, at 1396-1400.
89
See, e.g., ROITHMAYR, supra note 5, at 63-64, 108-16 (discussing ways that racial disparities in housing
wealth become self-reinforcing).
90
For example, discrimination by landlords that is designed to cater to the preferences of other tenants may
be a significant concern. See Pierre-Phillippe Combes et al., The Neighbor Is King: Customer Discrimination in
the Housing Market, (2012), available at https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00793403 (modeling the
influence of customer-based discrimination based on whether a landlord owns one or many units in the same
building, and finding evidence of this phenomenon in the French rental market).
91
See Strahilevitz, supra note 79 (discussing the use of exclusionary amenities in private communities).
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and maintain identifiably black neighborhoods. Do these countervailing
concerns undermine the claims above?
1. Gentrification and Displacement
To this point, the discussion of biased search heuristics has used as its
prototype the white homeseeker who shuns neighborhoods that include
more than a small percentage of minority households. This model of biased
search may seem anachronistic or at least incomplete. Indeed, given the
dynamics of gentrification, one might wonder whether the real threat to
minority communities today is not the risk that white households will stay
out, but rather that they will move in – not “white avoidance,” but “white
invasion.”92 On this account, it might seem that biased homeseeking could
at least diminish the chance that minority households will be displaced
through rising home prices or that communities of color will be torn apart
by rapid changes.
Addressing this line of reasoning requires us to consider gentrification’s
place within the larger frame of urban segregation. Although gentrification
stereotypically connotes dramatic racial turnover and displacement, its
association with these effects is empirically contested.93 A recent study
focusing directly on white entry into black neighborhoods finds that despite
a marked uptick in such invasion in the decade 2000 to 2010, it remained a
relatively limited phenomenon affecting no more than 11 percent of
predominantly black census tracts.94 Recent research on Chicago
neighborhoods suggests that predominantly minority neighborhoods are less
likely to gentrify or to continue on a path of gentrification than
neighborhoods with a substantial proportion of whites.95 Despite receiving
the lion’s share of attention, gentrification appears to be empirically
overshadowed by stasis and decline, at least in cities like Chicago and
Philadelphia.96
92

On white avoidance and white invasion, see generally Freeman & Cai, supra note 7.
This is partly a matter of definition. See, e.g., Jackelyn Hwang & Robert J. Sampson, Divergent Pathways
of Gentrification: Racial Inequality and the Social Order of Renewal in Chicago Neighborhoods, 79 AM. SOC.
REV. 726, 727 (2014) (adopting a definition of gentrification that “does not require that displacement or racial
turnover occur, which are still widely debated empirical questions”); see also Ding et al., supra note 96, at 2-5
(reviewing past literature on displacement and other consequences of gentrification); Ingrid Gould Ellen &
Katherine M. O’Regan, How Low Income Neighborhoods Change: Entry, Exit, and Enhancement, 41 REG. SCI. &
URB. ECON. 89 (2011) (presenting findings, based on a study of low-income neighborhoods in the 1990s,
suggesting that gentrification did not produce elevated levels of displacement or racial change).
94
Id. at 306, 309 (finding that 89 percent of predominantly black neighborhoods did not experience white
invasion, defined “as an increase in the white population that represents at least 5 percent of the total population at
the beginning of the decade.”). That figure is based on a definition of a black neighborhood as one that was over
50 percent non-Hispanic black in 2000; the proportion of uninvaded tracts rises to 95% if black neighborhoods are
defined as 90 percent non-Hispanic black. The distribution of white invasion has not been evenly spread across
the country, however, and affects larger and smaller percentages of tracts in different areas. See id. at 309, fig. 2.
95
See generally Hwang &. Sampson, supra note 93.
96
See, e.g., The Socioeconomic Change of Chicago’s Community Areas (1970-2010), Gentrification Index,
93
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None of this is meant to deny that invasive or disruptive gentrification
exists or that it carries the potential to visit significant harm on
communities, through displacement or otherwise.97 Nor does the current
infrequency of a phenomenon mean that it should be ignored when setting
policy, especially if the policies under discussion could alter its prevalence.
Yet the threat of gentrification does not offer a meaningful argument in
favor of disregarding homeseeker bias. On the contrary, harmful
gentrification may be best understood as a process that is itself crucially
fueled by race-based homeseeker choices.98
An analogy can be drawn to the cascading dynamics of “white flight.”99
In the standard gentrification story, there is an initial entry into a largely
minority neighborhood by a few white households.100 Their entrance might
be precipitated by neighborhood amenities or affordable rehabbing
Nathalie P. Voorhees Center for Neighborhood and Community Improvement, University of Illinois at Chicago 2
(October 2014), available at http://www.voorheescenter.com/#!gentrification-index/ccmx/ at 2 (“Although much
attention has been given to neighborhood upgrading (gentrification), our analysis illustrates that decline is much
more prevalent in the City of Chicago as a whole.”). This recent study of Chicago’s 77 official community areas
using a 13-factor gentrification index found that only 9 communities gentrified during the period 1970 to 2010, 3
more had smaller increases in factors correlated with gentrification, 34 did not experience a major change, and 31
experienced mild to severe decreases—with the largest decreases concentrated in the city’s far south and west
sides in majority African American or Latino communities. Id. at 22-25, 28. Recent work tracing neighborhood
changes in Philadelphia employing an income-based methodology similarly found “that only 15 of Philadelphia’s
372 residential census tracts gentrified from 2000 to 2014, while “[m]ore than 10 times that many census tracts—
164 in all—experienced statistically significant drops in median household income during the period studied[.].”
The Pew Charitable Trusts, Philadelphia’s Changing Neighborhoods (May 2016), available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/2016/05/philadelphias-changing-neighborhoods.
Another study of Philadelphia census tracts covering the period 2000 to 2013 employing a different methodology
found a higher rate of gentrification, though still involving a minority of tracts. Lei Ding et al., Gentrification and
Residential Mobility in Philadelphia, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper No. 15-36 at 1 (2015),
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2675379 (“Based on our measure, we identified a total of 56 of the 184 previously
low-income census tracts in Philadelphia as gentrifying from 2000 to 2013.”)
97
Clearly, some neighborhoods do experience the kind of rapid racial change that is most often associated
with harmful gentrification, even if this is not the statistically most common pattern. For example, of the fifteen
gentrified tracts identified in the Pew study of Philadelphia cited above, twelve “had higher percentages of white
residents in 2000 than the city as a whole” but the other three were “predominantly working-class AfricanAmerican tracts” in the Graduate Hospital neighborhood that experienced a drastic racial change with the black
population falling by more than half as the white population tripled. Pew Charitable Trusts, supra note 96, at 2.
98
See Hwang & Sampson, supra note 95, at 728-31; see also Bader & Warkentien, supra note 27, at 138
(positing that white avoidance drives gradual neighborhood changes). There are other important factors that drive
gentrification as well, primarily supply constraints on housing, that might be separately addressed. See, e.g., John
Mangin, The New Exclusionary Zoning, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 91 (2014).
99
See Freeman & Cai, supra note 7, at 315 (noting that “just as the integration created by blacks moving into
white neighborhoods often proved temporary, there is the risk that these black neighborhoods [experiencing white
entry] will soon become predominantly white”). For discussion of neighborhood “tipping” models, see generally
Thomas C. Schelling, A Process of Residential Segregation: Neighborhood Tipping, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
IN ECONOMIC LIFE 157 (Anthony H. Pascal ed., 1972). Recent empirical work using data from the 1970-2000
time period has come to inconsistent conclusions as to whether a tipping model like the one Schelling developed
matches with the way in which neighborhoods changed. Compare William Easterly, Empirics of Strategic
Interdependence: The Case of the Racial Tipping Point, NBER Working Paper 15069 (June 2009) (finding that
Schelling’s model of strategic interaction is largely not supported by the data) with David Card, Alexandre Mas,
and Jesse Rothstein, Tipping and the Dynamics of Segregation, 123 Q.J. ECON. 177–218 (2008) (finding evidence
of tipping in most cities, and calculating city-specific tipping points).
100
This stylized account is meant to capture the process popularly associated with harmful gentrification,
although gentrification occurs through a variety of processes that often diverge from this prototype. See supra
notes 96-95, 97.

18-Nov-16]

SEARCHING FOR FAIR HOUSING

19

opportunities, but their presence changes the composition of the
neighborhood in ways likely to attract more whites. Once the area becomes
known as gentrifying one, white households may enter in increasing
numbers based on anticipated racial trends.101 Plausibly, the changing racial
composition acts as an accelerant that causes more abrupt and disruptive
changes than would occur in the absence of race-based decisionmaking.
Seen through this lens, gentrification does not offer a counterpoint to
integrative efforts, but rather another reason why integrative efforts are
crucial to pursue.
Significantly, people moving into gentrifying neighborhoods do so
against a backdrop of pervasive segregation—one in which neighborhoods
may be viewed by large segments of the future resale market in binary
terms based on the predominant race of the residents. In such a world,
homeseekers may be willing to take a chance on a gentrifying neighborhood
only once it seems a sure bet to become predominantly white. A herding
response would explain why intensive gentrification occurs within certain
neighborhoods, while many other neighborhoods receive no economic boost
at all. On this account, the most harmful forms of gentrification are artifacts
of race-based homeseeking, not arguments for tolerating it. If more
neighborhoods were stably integrated, price increases and demographic
change would likely occur more evenly and organically across a larger set
of neighborhoods.102
2. Minority Preferences for Segregated Neighborhoods
Discussions about integration, when they do not run entirely aground on
the issue of gentrification, are often stopped dead in their tracks by the
assertion that segregated minority communities prefer to stay that way.103
This claim might seem to offer a powerful critique to the line of reasoning
pursued here. So what if white homeseekers are using biased heuristics to
skirt African-American neighborhoods? To suggest that this is a problem
might seem to offensively imply that the minority neighborhoods somehow
“need” white households in their midst.104
101

Gentrification involves in-movers who are wealthier than existing residents, so later in-movers could be
making decisions based only on the changing economic profile of the area rather than its changing racial
composition. It is also possible that many white in-movers flock to gentrifying areas because they seek racial
diversity, even as their increasing numbers make its sustainability less likely. Research suggests, however, that
this increased amenability to diversity has limits, and that racial composition helps explain why gentrification
occurs in some places and not others. See Hwang & Sampson, supra note 95, at 744-46.
102
Evidence suggests that neighborhood gains may be capable of benefiting both in-movers and stayers
without producing heightened levels of displacement. See, e.g., Ellen & O’Regan, supra note 93. Examining the
conditions under which such neighborhood upgrading can occur, and the potential for it to be combined with
sustainable increases in integration, represent important lines for future research.
103
See, e.g., CHARLES, supra note 29, at 3 (“[A]ccording to this argument, racial residential segregation
persists because that is the way everyone wants it: actual residential patterns reflect our unconstrained choices.”).
104
See, e.g., ELLEN, supra note 6, at 160 (“Policies to promote neighborhood racial mixing have also been

20

Fennell

[18-Nov-16

Yet the available evidence does not suggest that African-American
households generally desire high levels of racial separation. Far from an
entrenched desire for absolute segregation, most preference surveys show
black respondents respond favorably to a wide range of potential
demographic mixes—a much wider mix than are preferred by white
respondents.105 Summing up a large number of studies, Casey Dawkins
concludes that “evidence suggests that while both whites and blacks may
have preferences for living in neighborhoods where their own race is in the
majority, such preferences are still much stronger among whites, on
average, than among blacks.”106 A recent Chicago-area study finds the
same pattern, with black respondents reporting a much greater willingness
than whites to consider a wide mix of communities ranging “from nearly
all-white to nearly all-black and almost everything between.”107
The factors that shape minority preferences for predominantly minority
neighborhoods also deserve attention. Here, research offers stronger support
for explanations rooted in fear of discrimination by white neighbors than
“in-group favoritism.”108 As Maria Krysan and her coauthors explain, “you
cannot disentangle a preference from the historical and contemporary
experiences that African Americans have had with respect to discriminatory
attacked for being demeaning to minorities, that is, for presuming that there is something inherently wrong will
all-black communities.”).
105
There is strong and consistent evidence of this asymmetry, which has persisted over time in stated
preference surveys. See, e.g., ELLEN, supra note 6, at 46 (observing “that survey data consistently show that black
households are far more open [than whites] to a variety of racial mixes”); Maria Krysan & Reynolds Farley, The
Residential Preferences of Blacks: Do They Explain Persistent Segregation? 80 SOCIAL FORCES 937, 960 (2002)
960 (“There is no mistaking the pattern [shown by preference survey data]. Blacks are much more willing to live
with white neighbors than whites are willing to live with African Americans. And African Americans, in great
numbers, are willing to live in a neighborhood where they are one of a handful of black residents.”); Krysan and
Faison, Racial Attitudes: An Update (online at http://igpa.uillinois.edu/programs/racial-attitudes/detailed8 (“A
question in which blacks were asked if they would oppose living in a neighborhood that was half white shows . . .
just 7 percent either somewhat or strongly opposed to this in 2006” compared with 24 percent of whites who said
they “would be opposed to living in a half-black neighborhood”) (citation omitted).
106
Dawkins, supra note 87, at 393; see also CHARLES, supra note 29, at 125 (“Blacks, Latinos, and Asians . .
. all prefer substantially more racial integration and are more comfortable than whites as numerical minorities”
although “each group’s preference for same-race neighbors exceeds whites’ preferences for integration”).
107
Bader & Krysan, supra note 39, at 277. As Bader and Krysan explain, these findings “undermine the
idea that black self-segregation is responsible for metropolitan patterns of segregation.” Id. To be sure, even mild
preferences for same-race neighbors can generate powerful segregative dynamics. See, e.g., SCHELLING, supra
note 5, at 147-66; see also Mark Fossett, Ethnic Preferences, Social Distance Dynamics, and Residential
Segregation: Theoretical Explorations Using Simulation Analysis, 30 J. MATH. SOC. 185, 201 (2006) (observing
that even weak preferences for same race neighbors will be segregative when held by numeric minorities, if they
exceed the group’s representation in the population). But relatively weak preferences that are also significantly
endogenous to discrimination and existing choice sets are less likely to present binding constraints on greater
integration.
108
Krysan & Farley, supra note 105, at 965 (“[B]oth the qualitative and quantitative assessments of
unwillingness to move into an all-white neighborhood point to the important role of African Americans'
perceptions of whites' hostility and discrimination: African Americans who thought whites to be discriminatory
were less willing to pioneer and when directly asked why they would not move into such a neighborhood, the
majority gave reasons associated with hostility and discrimination.”); CHARLES, supra note 29, at 98 (“[A]reas
that are overwhelmingly white, or at least largely devoid of coethnics, are often perceived by nonwhites as hostile
and unwelcoming”). By contrast, “[t]he preferences of whites appear to be more directly shaped by active racial
prejudice . . . than by fears of out-group hostility or neutral ethnocentrism.” Id..
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actions of whites and institutional biases firmly imbedded in the housing
market.”109 Similarly, Sheryll Cashin speaks of “integration exhaustion”
experienced by blacks, who would rather avoid facing potential
discrimination or hostility in a mostly-white neighborhood.110 To the extent
that preferences are inferred from observed patterns of residential choice by
African-American households, it also becomes important to recognize the
severe constraints that often accompany home searches.111 One of the most
important constraints may well be existing segregated patterns that typically
limit blacks to “one of two choices: an almost all-black neighborhood or
one where blacks are few.”112
Nonetheless, black preferences are obviously heterogeneous and include
some affirmative preferences for predominantly black neighborhoods.113
And there is at least anecdotal evidence of African-American communities
seeking to maintain an area’s racial composition against in-movers.114 Yet
even these reactions may be understood not as a response to integration as
such, but rather to a societal pattern in which segregated minority
neighborhoods are shunned by whites unless and until there is evidence that
the area is going to be transformed into a wealthier and predominantly
white area. Preferences formed in the shadow of entrenched segregation and
dichotomous white responses—complete avoidance or outright takeover—
are unlikely to be reflective of preferences that might hold under different
conditions. Disrupting the search dynamics that contribute to segregation
and resegregation could make integration both more stable and more
attractive.

109

Krysan et al, supra note 35, at 40.
SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION 9, 17-32 (2004).
111
See Krysan et al., supra note 35, at 47-52 (citing research on the often time-pressured and involuntary
moves undertaken by low-income African-American households, and other economic limitations that “call[] into
question the very relevance of the idea of choices and preferences”); Stefanie DeLuca, What Is the Role of
Housing Policy? Considering Choice and Social Science Evidence, 34 J. URB. AFF. 21, 25-26 (2012) (urging
attention to the processes of preference formation and the constraints under which preferences are formed).
112
CASHIN, supra note 110, at 17 (citing Krysan & Farley, supra note 105, at 969); see also Jacob J. Vigdor,
Residential Segregation and Preference Misalignment, 54 J. URB. ECON. 587, 589 (2003) (“The indices reveal
that the nationwide proportion of Black households living in overwhelmingly Black neighborhoods vastly exceeds
the proportion of Black survey respondents stating a preference for such neighborhoods. The indices also reveal,
however, that the nationwide proportion of Black households with few or no Black neighbors exceeds the
proportion stating a preference for such neighborhoods.”).
113
See CASHIN, supra note 110, at 17-32 (discussing the range of attitudes blacks hold with respect to racial
composition); Vigdor, supra note 112 (estimating based on data from the Multi-City Urban Study of Urban
Inequality that elicits preferences about “ideal” neighborhood composition that “[r]oughly 3% of the Black
population in each metropolitan area would live on a block where more than 14 out of 15 residents (or 96.7%)
were Black”).
114
Ginia Bellafante, In Bed-Stuy Housing Market, Profit and Preservation Battle, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,
2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/21/nyregion/in-bed-stuy-housing-market-profit-and-preservationbattle.html.
110
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C. The Search Gap
The discussion above establishes that discriminatory search perpetuates
segregation and constrains housing choices for many households. Leaving
it unaddressed produces what I term here “the search gap”—the distance
that discriminatory search patterns interpose between meaningful fair
housing opportunities and the antidiscrimination duties that the law is
understood to impose.115 The search gap is one component of a larger
disconnect between rights and duties that plays an underappreciated role in
conflicts over antidiscrimination law. In Hohfeld’s famous schema, rights
and duties are “jural correlatives”: if one party holds a right, some other
party (or parties) must hold the corresponding duty.116 Conceptually, there
can be no gap between rights and duties; they must match up as a matter of
logic. Nonetheless, it is possible to hold inconsistent ideas about the
respective reach of rights and duties, as I suggest antidiscrimination law
often does.
Civil rights flow from a proposition about the moral irrelevance of
protected status, and seek to ensure that people’s lives will be not arbitrarily
constrained in certain important realms (employment, public
accommodations, housing) because of that status.117 Like property rights,
antidiscrimination rights are “multital” in character—corresponding not to a
duty held by a single party but rather to a set of duties held by many
parties.118 Unlike a property right, however, antidiscrimination law does not
impose duties universally on the rest of the world with the functional
equivalent of a “keep out” sign.119 The law focuses instead on eliminating
particular discriminatory acts committed by a limited slate of identifiable
actors whose conduct is both reachable and deemed to be the proper
business of law.120
115
Biased search is not the only source of a gap between rights and duties in the fair housing arena, nor is it
the only factor contributing to the persistence of segregation. See, e.g., Seicshnaydre, supra note 3, at 980-81. But
it is an important contributor to segregation that might be reached more effectively than it is presently. See id. at
972 (observing that, by focusing only on the interactions between minority homeseekers and housing access
providers, “[t]he law reaches only two parties in a three-party tango”).
116
HOHFELD, supra note 12, at 36.
117
Cf. Noah D. Zatz, Disparate Impact and the Unity of Equality Law, UCLA School of Law Research
Paper No. 16-06 (2016), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2730845 (identifying the goal of employment
discrimination law as the elimination or redress of “status causation”—workplace harms caused by one’s
protected status).
118
The term “multital” is Hohfeld’s; it corresponds to in rem (as opposed to in personam) rights. See
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 781-82 (2001)
(discussing Hohfeld’s idea of multital rights, for which he offered the example of land ownership).
119
See KHAITAN, supra note 16, at 62 (“Unlike typical duties in criminal law or the law of torts, the duties of
discrimination are not borne by everyone. Instead of a universal approach, the law identifies specific types of
persons to impose its burdens.”).
120
In some cases, the discriminatory preferences of one party can be reached by imposing duties on a
different party to enforce the correlative right in question. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and
Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 848 (2001) (explaining that where customers have biased preferences, “[t]he
employee’s correlative right [not to be discriminated against] is vindicated . . . not by suing customers, but by
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As a result, the law does not reach the full universe of discriminatory
acts that reduce housing opportunities based on protected status. There is
some discriminatory conduct that we cannot reach, and some discriminatory
conduct that we seem unwilling to reach. For example, we cannot reach
discriminatory conduct that occurred long in the past or that is too subtle or
diffuse to pin on particular actors. Conduct that society is presently
unwilling to reach can be found, for example, in various exceptions to
antidiscrimination law.121 Discriminatory homeseeker conduct spans the
“can’t reach” and “won’t reach” categories. Some of it might be impossible
to prove, but there is also a widespread view that it would be normatively
unacceptable to reach it even if it were possible.122 This suggests that the
most normatively attractive account of duties may not correspond to the
most normatively attractive account of rights.
There is more than one way to reconcile this inconsistency. Most
obviously, society can focus on distributing enumerated duties based on its
preferred normative criteria for imposing liability, and then simply tailor
rights to match.123 At first this might seem not only correct, but inevitable.
All the law can ever do is grant the rights that match up to the liabilities that
it imposes. But there is no reason to assume that the analysis should start
with duties, and then reverse engineer rights. It might seem more in keeping
with the spirit of antidiscrimination law to do the opposite: shape liability in
ways that are designed to make race irrelevant to housing opportunities.
Thus, we might begin with the premise that every household has the right to
a set of housing options that is not materially constricted by race and then
set about distributing duties throughout society in a manner calculated to
achieve this result. If the slate of duty-holders cannot be broadened to
capture all discriminatory conduct, then heavier burdens must be placed on
other actors.
Of course, the relevant statutory scheme will determine which of these
approaches, or what combination of them, can be carried out under existing
law—a point I will come to later. My point at this stage is purely
conceptual. If the law cannot or will not impose nondiscrimination duties
on homeseekers, the costs associated with their discriminatory choices must
forbidding those who hire the people who deal with customers from raising ‘customer preferences’ as a defense”);
see infra Part III.D (discussing potential liability in cases of assisted search).
121
See, e.g., the exception for “Mrs. Murphy” landlords. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2).
122
See, e.g., KHAITAN, supra note 16, at 195-213; Seicshnaydre, supra note 3, at 1001; see also ELLEN,
supra note 6, at 169 (“[F]or obvious reasons, policies that restrict people’s freedom to live where they want should
be avoided”); ANDERSON, supra note 32, at 175 (defining an “informal realm” that includes “people’s choices of
friends, acquaintances, associates, and neighbors” and stating that “antidiscrimination laws should not cover such
informal discrimination”).
123
For example, focusing on certain actors who intentionally discriminate corresponds to what Alan
Freeman has called “the perpetrator perspective.” See Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052-57
(1978) see also Zatz, supra note 117, at 6-7, 31-37.
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fall somewhere else—whether on the members of protected groups who are
disadvantaged by their search conduct, on parties who are in a position to
influence or channel homeseeker choices, or somewhere else. Significantly,
then, the parties potentially harmed by unaddressed bias in homeseeking
include not only those directly disadvantaged, but also third parties who
may be required by the law to help take up the slack. It thus becomes
important to parse the conventional assumption that homeseeker
discrimination is normatively unreachable. The next Part takes up that task.
II. THE AUTONOMY OBJECTION
The second principal rationale for exempting biased homeseeking, apart
from its alleged harmlessness, is that attempting to address it would
represent too serious an intrusion on normative values like decisional
autonomy, privacy, and intimate association, which I will refer to
collectively here as autonomy. It might seem that nothing is more central to
the identity of a family than choosing where to live. The idea that the
process of selecting a home could be anyone else’s business may seem
intuitively repugnant. But this assumption requires investigation. After all,
it was at one time mainstream to view ownership as conferring an
unqualified right to refuse a transfer, as well as the right to control who
would move in nearby.124 Section A probes the basis for shielding search
that is, by hypothesis, socially harmful. Section B develops an account of
the duties that might appropriately be placed on homeseekers, drawing on
an approach that can already be seen in fair housing law.
A. Why Shield Search?
The idea that considerations of autonomy or “negative liberty” render
homeseeking unreachable can be broken down into several possible claims.
One claim might be that actors who make choices in certain capacities, such
as “tenant,” simply act in too private a role for the state’s coercive power to
reach. Thus, Tarunabh Khaitan observes that “duty-bearers” in
antidiscrimination law “tend to gravitate towards the public end of the
124
See, e.g., ROSE HELPER, RACIAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS 123-24 (1969)
(reporting results of a study of white real estate brokers in which significant numbers of respondents “hold the
premise that people have the right to choose their neighbors and their neighborhood and that it is wrong to force
people to live with neighbors they do not want”); Wendell E. Pritchett, Where Shall We Live? Class and
Limitations of Fair Housing Law, 35 URBAN LAWYER 399, 403 (2003) (observing that the claims of fair housing
advocates in the period prior to the enactment of the Fair Housing Act “contradicted the widely accepted principle
that property ownership included the full right of disposal”). See also Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 3, at 22-25
(arguing that autonomy interests must be weighed against other competing interests, such as nondiscrimination,
and observing that there has been evolution over time in how that balance is struck); Whitney, supra note 8, at 3
(“Autonomy does not militate against an expansion of antidiscrimination law, unless one presupposes the very
allocation of rights that proponents of expansion are critiquing.”).
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public-private spectrum,” where a party’s claim to negative liberty is
attenuated by the public nature of the capacity in which she acts.125
Extended broadly to the homeseeking context, the claim might be that
deciding who one will live among is a deeply private and personal matter,
implicating questions of privacy and association.
Yet antidiscrimination law, as well as the U.S. Constitution, plainly
withdraws from households the right to choose their neighbors.126
Providers of housing are legally constrained from delivering on consumer
preferences for racially homogeneous residential environments.127 It is also
unlawful for current residents to keep out would-be arrivals based on race
through restrictive covenants, threats, violence, or other forms of
interference.128 Nor can current residents band together and use the
instrument of public or private government to restrict who may move in.129
Once one recognizes that the law (uncontroversially and appropriately)
withdraws the right to control the racial composition of one’s neighbors, it
becomes difficult to understand how there could be an autonomy right to
attempt to do exactly that. And as this analysis makes plain, current
antidiscrimination law already imposes certain duties on private households,
negating any notion of a blanket free pass for people acting in the capacity
of resident.
A different form of the argument might treat the act of choosing a home
as a very special sphere of autonomy into which the law should not
intrude.130 The home bundles together countless attributes, including
surrounding amenities and neighbor characteristics;131 all contribute to an
overall vibe or feel of the place. As a site that will be crucial to the
occupants’ identity, the home might seem too personal and important a
decision to subject to any second-guessing by government agents. And
unlike stand-alone acts such as trying to enforce a restrictive covenant
against one’s neighbor or harassing her based on her race, choosing a home
is a complex decision that is opaque to outsiders.132
125

KHAITAN, supra note 16, at 207.
See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that racially restrictive covenants cannot be
constitutionally enforced); Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (observing that if a
condo association were to post “a sign saying, ‘No Observant Jews Allowed’” it “would undoubtedly violate [42
U.S.C.] § 3604(a)”); Seniors Civil Liberties Ass’n v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030, 1036 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Whatever the
penumbral right to privacy found in the Constitution might include, it excludes without question the right to
dictate or to challenge whether families with children may move in next door to you.”).
127
See notes 216-218 and accompanying text.
128
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), 3617, and 3631.
129
See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009).
130
See, e.g., Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 1093 (2009) (discussing and critiquing the ways in which law privileges the home).
131
See, e.g., Quillian, supra note 82, at 242 (“[P]laces are actually bundles of multiple attributes, which
matter simultaneously in how households choose destinations.”); Barton A. Smith, Racial Composition as a
Neighborhood Amenity, in THE ECONOMICS OF URBAN AMENITIES 165 (Douglas B. Diamond, Jr., & George S.
Tolley, eds., 1982) (discussing the role of neighborhood racial composition).
132
Henry Smith has explored the related idea that property holdings are opaque by design, serving as
126
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A focus on opacity might seem to suggest the concern boils down to
proof problems and the difficulty in disentangling malign from benign
motivations. But there is another point here as well: the government’s
attempt to disentangle motivations may itself constitute an autonomy
intrusion.133 People searching for homes may wish to respond to subjective
impressions that would later be difficult to articulate if called to account.
Of course, landlords have made similar points as well—that they may wish
to respond subjectively to tenants based on difficult-to-pinpoint aspects of
their personalities. And just as we worry in the landlord context that those
hard-to-pin-down gut feelings about a prospective tenant are simply
prejudice,134 we might justifiably worry that overall subjective impressions
about neighborhoods will be infected by racial bias.135
Nonetheless, the burden of requiring a nondiscriminatory explanation
for a housing choice decision seems too high. Should a family have to
divulge details of its personal habits, sleeping arrangements, procreation
plans, work hours, bathing schedules, and so on to a government official to
explain why they chose the home on Mulberry Avenue and not the one on
Pecan Drive? Aside from the prohibitive administrative costs of such an
approach, such inquiries would be unacceptably intrusive.
This does not mean that homeseeker search behavior must be ignored
entirely, however. Law can address search processes without controlling
anyone’s ultimate decision. A high-profile example of this approach is banthe-box legislation that forbids initial employment screening based on past
convictions, while still allowing that factor to be considered in ultimate
decisionmaking.136 But unlike ban-the-box, which may counterproductively
increase statistical discrimination,137 restrictions in the homeseeking arena
could directly target race-based search heuristics. As I will suggest below,
“information hiding” modules, each of which operates like a “black box” as to outsiders. See, e.g., Henry E.
Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2097, 2111-16 (2012).
133
Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (applying the constitutional prohibition on “excessive
entanglement between government and religion”).
134
See, e.g., Marable v. H. Walker & Assoc., 644 F.2d 390, 396 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding that the district court
“failed to consider whether defendant’s rejection of [plaintiff’s] application for tenancy was a pretext for racial
discrimination” where the cited reasons included refuted factual assertions and the claim that the plaintiff “got ‘a
little smart’ during one phone call”).
135
See supra notes 49, 55 and accompanying text.
136
See, e.g., JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 231-35 (2014)
(discussing approaches that limit categorical exclusion through application questions or advertising but preserve
ultimate decisionmaking authority); see also Andrew Elmore, Civil Disabilities in an Era of Diminishing Privacy:
A Disability Approach for the Use of Criminal Records in Hiring, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 991 (2015); Kimani PaulEmile, Beyond Title VII: Rethinking Race, Ex-Offender Status, and Employment Discrimination in the Information
Age, 100 VA. L. REV. 893, 936-39 (2014).
137
See, e.g., Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Statistical Discrimination: A
Field Experiment, Michigan Law and Economics Research Paper No. 16-012 (2016); Jennifer L. Doleac &
Benjamin Hansen, Does “Ban the Box” Help or Hurt Low-Skilled Workers? Statistical Discrimination and
Employment Outcomes when Criminal Histories Are Hidden, NBER Working Paper No. 22469,
www.//nber.org/papers/w22469; see also LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ, INFORMATION AND EXCLUSION 142-46
(2011); Strahilevitz, supra note 24.
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we already have a version of this approach within the FHA itself: the
incomplete exception for Mrs. Murphy landlords.138
B. Chance Encounters and Categorical Exclusion
For the reasons discussed above, directly policing the ultimate housing
decisions of homeseekers is neither workable nor normatively attractive.
But this does not mean that the homeseeker’s decision structure is
unreachable. That structure might be modified to do two things: first, raise
the costs of homeseeker discrimination (relative to making less biased
decisions); and second, create environments in which learning—and
associated disruptions to existing assumptions and patterns—might take
place. Regulating aspects of the search environment without directly
regulating the ultimate decisions that homeseekers reach can be understood
as a form of “choice architecture” or “nudge”139 that is designed to limit
resort to categorical exclusion based on racial criteria.140
Although it long predates the term “choice architecture,” the structure of
the so-called Mrs. Murphy exception to the FHA can be viewed in just such
terms, as I explain below. A similar combination of decisional autonomy
and structured choice might be employed to address the tension between
intimate association rights and the public interest in nondiscrimination in
the roommate context, where housing provision and homeseeking often blur
together. Here, I offer a novel alternative to the approach the Ninth Circuit
took in Roommate.com.141 Finally, I outline how the same conceptual
approach could be applied to the homeseeking context more generally.
1. Nudging Mrs. Murphy
The FHA contains a number of limited exceptions, but none is more
interesting and perplexing than the so-called “Mrs. Murphy exception,”
which exempts from certain prohibitions “rooms or units in dwellings
138
42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (exempting from certain provisions of the Fair Housing Act “rooms or units in
dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended to be occupied by no more than four families living
independently of each other, if the owner actually maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his
residence.”); see infra Part II.B.2 (analyzing this exception’s failure to exempt qualifying units from prohibitions
on discrimination advertisements and statements). A parallel exception for single family homeowners who meet
certain criteria follows the same pattern and can be analyzed in the same way. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1); infra
note 142.
139
See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008); see also Ingrid Gould Ellen, Supporting
Integrative Choices, 17(5) POVERTY & RACE 3 (Sept/Oct 2008) (invoking Thaler & Sunstein notion of the
“nudge” and urging thought about how choice architecture around residential location decisions might be revised
to promote more racial integration).
140
Cf. Emens, supra note 8, at 1311 (arguing that even though intimate discrimination should not itself be
actionable, “law should take account of its role in intimate discrimination at a structural level”); id. at 1366-73
(examining law’s structural role in intimate discrimination).
141
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, 666 F.3d. 1216 (9th Cir. 2012).
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containing living quarters occupied or intended to be occupied by no more
than four families living independently of each other, if the owner actually
owns and occupies one of such living quarters as his residence.”142 The
exception’s popular name comes from the politicized specter of an elderly
widow who must take in boarders to meet expenses.143 The arguments for
exempting such landlords seem to track the two raised above: Mrs. Murphy
plausibly has a greater interest in negative freedom surrounding rentals than
do her commercial landlord counterparts, and landlords of this type might
be thought to represent such a small share of the rental market as to pose
little real threat to housing access.144
Section 3603(b)(2) of the FHA exempts a Mrs. Murphy landlord from §
3604’s antidiscrimination provisions, but it does so with an important
exception: Section 3604(c)’s prohibition on biased advertisements, notices,
and statements remains in force, even for Mrs. Murphy.145 This combination
of exemption and exception generates seemingly anomalous results. Mrs.
Murphy can discriminate without fearing liability under the FHA as long as
she doesn’t tell the rejected tenant why she is rejecting him (but she can be
liable if she is honest).146 Moreover, because Mrs. Murphy cannot use
advertising to screen out tenants to whom she will not rent, she and the
would-be tenants alike must bear higher search costs.147 These anomalies
also present a potential constitutional issue: regulating advertising and
statements beyond the scope of underlying illegality could raise First

142
42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2). A similarly-structured provision exempts owners of single-family residences who
meet certain criteria from FHA liability for discriminatory choices in selling or renting their home. 42 U.S.C. §
3603(b)(1). Although I will focus in the text on the Mrs. Murphy exception, the same analysis applies to the
single-family-homeowner exception, which likewise leaves otherwise exempt actors exposed to liability for their
ads or statements.
143
For more on the history of the Mrs. Murphy exception and its roots in debates over public
accommodations law, see Rigel Oliveri, Discriminatory Housing Advertisements On-line: Lessons from Craigslist,
43 IND. L. REV. 1125, 1135-38 (2010).
144
When the FHA was enacted in 1968, Senator Walter Mondale estimated that the fraction of housing units
qualifying for the exception was and would remain at approximately three percent. See James D. Walsh, Note,
Reaching Mrs. Murphy: A Call for the Repeal of the Mrs. Murphy Exemption to the Fair Housing Act, 34 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 605, 606 n.6 (1999) (citing 114 CONG. REC. 2495, 3424 (1968) (statements of Sen. Mondale)).
Data limits make it unclear what percentage of the rental housing stock currently falls under the exemption. See
id. It is, however, possible to calculate an upper-bound limit. As of 2013, 19.04% of rental housing stock was in
2-4 unit buildings. See Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, America’s Rental Housing 14, 39
tbl A-2 (2015) available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/americas-rental-housing (providing data from which this
figure was calculated). According to 2014 data, 87% of 2-4 unit buildings are owned by individuals or trusts. Id.
at 15. The product of these two figures, 16.57%, includes all units that would qualify for the Mrs. Murphy
exemption, but also units owned by trusts and by individuals living elsewhere which would not qualify. The true
fraction is thus likely considerably lower.
145
That provision makes it unlawful“[t]o make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published
any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any
preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national
origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c).
146
If her discrimination is based on race or on classifications that would have counted as racial in 1866,
however, she would still face potential liability under § 1982. See 42 U.S.C. § 1982; Shaare Tefila Congregation
v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617-18 (1987).
147
See, e.g., Oliveri, supra note 143, at 1165.
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Amendment concerns.148
A variety of explanations have been floated for the differential treatment
of advertisement and act, statement and sentiment.149 Of particular
relevance here is the idea that holding Mrs. Murphy to the standard of
unbiased advertising will alter the information environment in which she
makes decisions, and, in the process, potentially render those decisions less
biased. If she cannot keep away entire categories of people through her
advertisements, she will be forced to encounter homeseekers one-on-one, on
the phone, online, or in person. Confronting people as individuals may
produce a learning effect that causes her to reconsider the stereotypes that
she harbors.150 Even if the encounter is an awkward or uncomfortable one,
it may carry some of the generative insulation-breaking power that Jerry
Frug has associated with chance encounters in public spaces within cities.151
Thus, the FHA will not second-guess the choices that Mrs. Murphy
ultimately makes about to whom she will rent, but it will not allow her to
screen people out categorically based on their group status. Nor will the
FHA allow her to turn them away with an overt statement about that status;
she need not be particularly polite, but she must find a way to interact with
them without mentioning their group status as a reason for her refusal to
deal. The FHA thus mandates that she make any discriminatory choices on
a retail rather than wholesale basis, within a facially neutral search process.
To be sure, there are unanswered empirical questions about how well
this setup works to change behavior, as well as normative questions about
148
The application of § 3604(c) to Mrs. Murphy landlords has been upheld against constitutional challenge.
United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 213-14 & n.10 (4th Cir. 1972). However, evolution in the commercial
speech doctrine raises doubts about the continuing validity of such precedents. See, e.g., STRAHILEVITZ, supra
note 136, at 97 (2011) (questioning whether decisions upholding advertising bans in Mrs. Murphy situations
remain good law, given changes in the Supreme Court’s commercial speech doctrine); see also Chicago Lawyers
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law v. Craigslist, 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008) (Easterbrook, CJ.) (observing in
dicta, after noting that § 3603(b)(1)’s exemption for single-family homes permits liability for advertising, that
“any rule that forbids truthful advertising of a transaction that would be substantively lawful encounters serious
problems under the first amendment”). It should be noted, however, that the gap between the scope of § 3604(c)’s
prohibitions and the unlawfulness of the underlying conduct is much smaller than commonly assumed, due in
large part to § 1982 (which bans racial discrimination in housing transactions, without exception) and more
restrictive state and local laws. See Robert G. Schwemm, Discriminatory Housing Statements and § 3604(c): A
New Look at the Fair Housing Act's Most Intriguing Provision, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 187, 293-94 (2001)
(making these points and concluding that, “[a]s a result, the modern ‘commercial speech’ doctrine, though
generous in its protection of legal and non-misleading messages, continues to provide a safe haven for § 3604(c)
in all but the narrowest of circumstances.”).
149
See, e.g., STRAHILEVITZ, supra note 136, at 96-97 (discussing circuit court decisions that focused on the
potential spillovers of Mrs. Murphy advertisements in deterring nonwhites from searching in a given area of the
city or creating misimpressions about antidiscrimination law); Schwemm, supra note 148, at 223, n.162 (citing
legislative history focusing on the damaging effects of the speech itself).
150
Cf. EDUARDO PEÑALVER & SONIA KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS 67-70 (2010) (explaining how civil
rights sit-ins changed attitudes).
151
See Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1050 (1996) (“Big cities are a
prime location in America for the experience of otherness: They put people in contact, whether they like it or not,
with men and women who have values, opinions, or desires that they find unfamiliar, strange, even offensive.”)
See also Dawkins, supra note 87, at 389 (describing “the contact hypothesis, which states that interracial
prejudices decline as groups gain familiarity with each other and come into contact with each other more often in
social situations”).
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any system that raises search costs—often quite asymmetrically—for
homeseekers as well as for Mrs. Murphy landlords.152 My aim here is not
to take a position on the qualified Mrs. Murphy exception but rather to point
out how it works to structure the search environment while at the same time
recognizing a realm of decisional freedom. As I will show, a similar
approach could be extended to homeseeking, an arena where heightened
search costs would largely be borne by the discriminator.
2. Reining in Roommates
One of the most interesting recent questions in fair housing law
surrounds whether and how the prohibitions on discriminatory housing
choice apply to roommates who are sharing a residence. This issue reads on
questions of housing search both by analogy and in the following more
direct sense: roommate matching is often undertaken reciprocally in ways
that blur traditional lines between housing providers and housing
demanders.
In Roommate.com, the Ninth Circuit held that shared living situations lie
entirely outside of the purview of the FHA, based on its reading of the word
“dwelling.”153 The court’s interpretation drew heavily on what it took to be
the assumptions of Congress at the time of the FHA’s enactment, as well as
on the canon of constitutional avoidance—triggered in this case by concerns
about the intimate association rights implicated in roommate choices.154
Throughout the lively majority opinion, Judge Kozinski recounted myriad
ways in which roommates might find themselves incompatible or just
uncomfortable with roommates of a different sex or religion, from the fear
being seen in a towel while in transit from the shower155 to discovering
foods in the refrigerator that violate one’s religious restrictions.156
Significantly, the court’s approach read shared living situations out of
the FHA entirely—a result that not only keeps people from being forced
into housing relationships that offend their beliefs or their modesty, but that
also legalizes facially discriminatory roommate ads, such as for “whites
only” group houses.157 There is another way of interpreting the statutory
text in the roommate context, however—one that would address the court’s
concerns about intimate association without resorting to a strained reading
152
Mrs. Murphy can turn away a prospective tenant after a single glance, whereas that would-be tenant may
have invested considerable time and money to come view the apartment.
153
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, 666 F.3d. 1216 (9 th Cir. 2012).
154
Id. at 1220, 1222-23.
155
Id. at 1221 (“a girl may not want to walk around in her towel in front of a boy”).
156
Id. (“An orthodox Jew may want a roommate with similar beliefs and dietary restrictions, so he won’t
have to worry about finding honey-baked ham in the refrigerator next to the potato latkes.”).
157
I thank Eduardo Peñalver and Michael Schill for discussions on this point and on other aspects of the
Roommate.com decision.
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of “dwelling” that places roommates entirely outside the law.158 It is
animated by the same general principle discussed in the Mrs. Murphy
context: preserving a sphere of decisional autonomy while structuring the
search environment to permit the learning that can come from chance
encounters with individual people.159
Textually, this alternative would read the prohibitions in § 3604 to
extend a conclusive presumption that individual roommate selections are
not “because of” protected status if they are made in accordance with
required search protocols.160 These search protocols would incorporate the
bans on statements and advertisements in § 3604(c), potentially modified to
fit the roommate context. For example, roommate ads for residents of the
same sex or for co-religionists might be justified on the grounds that there
are valid, nondiscriminatory reasons (modesty or religious observance) for
categorically limiting one’s search along these dimensions.161 But with
respect to protected characteristics for which no plausible categorical
intimate association interest for roommates exists, such as race,162 the ban
on discriminatory ads would remain in force. This approach would push
roommates to select or reject each other as individuals rather than
categorically based on group status alone—even as it protected their
ultimate selections from scrutiny.163
158
The FHA defines “dwelling” as “any building, structure, or portion thereof which is occupied as, or
designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one or more families, and any vacant land which is offered
for sale or lease for the construction or location thereon of any such building, structure, or portion thereof.” 42
U.S.C. § 3602(b) (emphasis added). For a critique of the 9th Circuit’s failure in Roommate.com to distinguish
among different kinds of shared living arrangements based on structural features and capacity to achieve privacy
(e.g., through locks on doors and separate bedrooms), see Tim Iglesias, Does the Fair Housing Act Apply to
“Shared Living Situations”? Or The Trouble With Roommates, 22 AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV.
L. 111, 124-25 (2014).
159
See Oliveri, supra note 143 (attributing this point to Eduardo Peñalver).
160
For a different proposed alternative, see Iglesias, supra note 158, at 144-46 (arguing for varying treatment
of roommate advertising depending on where and how the advertising occurred).
161
An analogy might be drawn to Title VII’s “bona fide occupational qualification” defense, which allows
employers to select employees based on religion, sex, or national origin (but not race) where doing so is
“reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(e)(1). Such a selectively categorical approach may be implicit in HUD’s longstanding recognition of an
exception to § 3604(c) for sex, but not other protected statuses, when the advertising is for shared living
arrangements. See Roberta Actenberg, Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity,
Memorandum, Guidance Regarding Advertisements Under §804(c) of the Fair Housing Act, Jan. 9, 1995, at 2
(“Intake staff should not accept a complaint against a newspaper for running an advertisement which includes the
phrase female roommate wanted because the advertisement does not indicate whether the requirements for the
shared living exception have been met.”) (emphasis in original). This exception was previously codified at 24
C.F.R. § 109.20 (b)(5). 24 C.F.R Part 109 was subsequently withdrawn by HUD, but the withdrawal was
accompanied by a statement that the Part contained “nonbinding guidance” that was “very helpful to HUD
clients” but that would thenceforth be provided in handbook or other guidance formats rather than in the Code of
Federal Regulations. 61 FED. REG. 14378 (Apr. 1, 1996).
162
Cf. Soules v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Development 967 F.2d 817, 824 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding
landlord’s question about children in the household did not necessarily violate the FHA because there could be a
valid purpose for asking, but suggesting there would never be a valid reason for asking about race).
163
But see Oliveri, supra note 143, at 1170-71 (considering and rejecting an approach that would retain an
advertising ban for roommates, in part because it would raise the costs to minority roommate-seekers in locating
housemates of the same race, ethnicity, or nationality).
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3. The Homeseeker’s Search
In both of the situations above, suppressing discriminatory signals could
hold value even if there were no effort to regulate bias in ultimate housing
decisions. The value stems from two sources. First, restricting the
discriminatory signal raises the cost of exclusion by requiring would-be
discriminators to deal directly with individuals rather than categorically
screening them out. Second, bringing such parties into direct contact with
individuals possessing protected characteristics may produce a learning
effect.
We come now to the question of homeseeker search heuristics. Here
too, it would be feasible to harmonize an interest in decisional privacy and
autonomy with principles of nondiscrimination by regulating the search
environment while applying a conclusive presumption that decisions
reached within that search environment are nondiscriminatory in nature. As
in the prior examples, search protocols could be adjusted to raise the costs
of discrimination, preserve the potential for learning through chance
encounters, and prevent people from engaging in categorical exclusions
based on group membership. In the next Part, I will consider some ways
that such structuring might proceed.
As I will explain, existing law can potentially reach homeseekers who
use discriminatory advertising or statements or employ others (including
apps and websites) to carry out biased searches. Unlike in the situations
above, the dampening of informational signals in the homeseeking context
primarily places costs on the party who is seeking to discriminate—here,
the homeseeker. Sellers and landlords may be inconvenienced to some
degree by showing homes to homeseekers who have engaged in less
comprehensive prescreening based on their own biases, if those biases
prove intractable. Nonetheless, those housing providers will also gain the
potential capacity to complete some transactions that would not otherwise
occur. And, importantly, the homeseeker cannot impose costs on others
without imposing equal or larger costs on herself by actually going to look
at the places in question.
Before turning to specific doctrinal vehicles for achieving this result, it
is important to emphasize a point that this paper’s focus on white avoidance
has muted: the normative analysis above and the doctrinal points below
would apply regardless of the race of the homeseeker pursuing a racial
composition preference. As a result, strategies designed to address white
avoidance may run counter to deeply held preferences by some minority
households. In assessing this concern, it is important to recognize the mild
and contingent nature of many minority preferences for same-race
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neighbors,164 and the related possibility that lower levels of society-wide
segregation would alter the nature of race-based preferences across all
groups. Nonetheless, one cannot escape the possibility that altering search
protocols could interfere with some minority homeseeking preferences.
Although this possibility does complicate the normative picture, 165 the
large and asymmetric harms that residential segregation visits on minority
households must also be kept in mind. There is in fact no way to pursue the
Fair Housing Act’s goal of integration without making a value judgment
against segregationist preferences, even those held by African-American
households.166 This does not mean anyone’s ultimate choice about where to
live will be withdrawn, only that the law is not neutral on the issue of
housing patterns. Just as the law already limits what sellers, landlords, and
realtors can do to maintain a neighborhood’s current racial composition—
whatever it may be167—the law can take measures to influence and regulate
the search environment.
III. ADDRESSING HOMESEEKING THROUGH LAW
Although the question is rarely analyzed in any depth, it is widely
assumed that existing law does not reach discriminatory homeseeking. This
Part challenges that assumption. Viable doctrinal avenues—albeit wholly
unrecognized ones—already exist for reaching aspects of homeseeking in a
manner consistent with the normative considerations and constraints
developed in the previous two Parts.
I begin this Part by questioning the assumption that housing choices
made for racially biased reasons are, as commentators are wont to put it,
164

See supra notes 105-112 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Seicshnaydre, supra note 3, at 1001 (explaining that “seeking to hold white people responsible
for their own housing choices” would be “untenable for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that . . . we
would also have to hold blacks liable for their own housing choices to the extent that those choices perpetuated
segregation”); cf. Oliveri supra note 143, at 1170-71 (arguing that the Fair Housing Act should not reach
roommate advertisements, in part because it would burden minority group members who wished to live with
members of the same race, ethnicity, or nationality).
166
The text assumes that symmetrical treatment of race-based homeseeking by whites and blacks would be
required. For recent analyses of the symmetry principle in antidiscrimination law, see e.g., Naomi Schoenbaum,
The Case for Symmetry in Antidiscrimination Law, WISC. L. REV. (forthcoming 2071) draft available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2837737; Bradley A. Arehart, The Symmetry Principle, working paper 2016, available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2837939. Where it is well established that white avoidance systematically does more
societal harm than other forms of self-segregation, however, that might supply a neutral reason for setting
enforcement priorities. Moreover, certain kinds of symmetrical treatments would interfere substantially less with
minority homeseeking preferences than with white homeseeking preferences. See infra note 243 and
accompanying text (providing the example of prohibiting search tools that filter neighborhoods based on whether
one’s own race constitutes a majority or super-majority in that neighborhood). I thank Noah Zatz for this point.
Self-segregation on religious grounds implicates additional constitutional interests that I do not delve into here.
167
For example, existing interpretations of antidiscrimination law would prohibit a black homeseller from
favoring a black buyer over a white one in an effort to maintain a neighborhood’s character—despite the deeply
felt sense of neighborhood identity that might prompt such conduct. See Bellafante, supra note 114. Even if such
a seller were exempt under § 3603(b)(1) of the Fair Housing Act, which would depend on a variety of factors, §
1982’s blanket ban on intentional racial discrimination in housing transactions would reach the conduct.
165
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“perfectly legal.”168 Although the Fair Housing Act probably does not make
it unlawful for homeseekers to discriminate based on race in their selection
of a home, Section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 almost certainly
does. However, for a number of reasons, § 1982 does not offer an especially
useful or attractive stand-alone vehicle for reaching homeseeking.
Nonetheless, § 1982 buttresses (and saves from a key criticism) the use of
other provisions within the FHA, including the prohibition on
discriminatory advertisements and statements, to reach certain collateral
actions undertaken by homeseekers or by those assisting them in the course
of conducting a housing search. As I show, this approach is fully consistent
with both the text and purpose of the FHA.
A. The Househunter’s (Legal) Prerogative?
One can fairly conclude that the “housing refusal” prohibition in §
3604(a) of the FHA does not outlaw a homeseeker’s racially biased housing
choice. That provision makes it illegal to “to refuse to sell or rent after the
making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of,
or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of
race [or another protected status].” Anyone who purchases or rents a home
can in some sense be said to have made that dwelling unavailable to
everyone else.169 But in the typical case, a biased homeseeker does not
make a particular dwelling unavailable to anyone because of race; rather,
she makes it unavailable to everyone regardless of race.170
The cumulative effect of homeseeker choices may indeed be to make
dwellings unavailable because of race, whether through price effects or
otherwise. Similarly, by participating in biased housing choices that
entrench segregation, a homeseeker might be said to have contributed to
making a particular sort of dwelling—one situated in an integrated
neighborhood—unavailable because of race.171 Yet no home chooser
168

See supra note 3.
See Michigan Protection and Advocacy Service v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 345 (6 th Cir. 1994).
170
There have in fact been some cases involving purchases motivated by the desire to deprive protected
group members of the opportunity to buy or occupy a dwelling. In Babin, the Sixth Circuit held that even a
purchase motivated by a desire to keep out members of a protected group presents no cognizable FHA violation,
see id., though at least two subsequent federal district courts have declined to follow Babin’s lead. See U.S. v.
Hughes, 849 F.Supp. 685 (D. Neb. 1994) (denying motion to dismiss where a bank financed a purchase allegedly
undertaken for the purpose of preventing the property’s purchase for a group home for mentally disabled adults);
Step-by-Step v. Lazarus, 1997 WL 853508, 11 NDLR P 182 (M.D. Pa. 1997) (finding that the Fair Housing Act
“does apply to a buyer who purchases a property with the intention of preventing the purchase by an entity
planning to use the property as a Group Home for members protected under the Act”). But situations involving
exclusionary motives for purchase are, one would hope, rare outliers.
171
If a dwelling is understood not just as a structure but also as a bundle of attributes that incorporates
effects from outside the property boundaries, then segregation effectively withdraws one dwelling type (a home in
a integrated neighborhood) from the market and replaces it with a very different one (a home in a segregated
neighborhood). See generally LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME (2009) (examining the implications
of a broad conceptualization of the home that encompasses off-parcel amenities and effects).
169
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produces such results alone.172 If the prohibitions on discriminatory
decisionmaking in the FHA were the only ones in play, the conclusion that
homeseeking is doctrinally unreachable would be a sensible one.
But there is another path to homeseeker liability: Section 1982 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. Although often upstaged by the FHA, § 1982
remains a powerful part of the antidiscrimination arsenal. Unlike the FHA,
it does not contain any exceptions. It covers both private and governmental
discrimination.173 And it is squarely directed at racial discrimination.174 The
provision reads in full as follows: “All citizens of the United States shall
have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white
citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property.”175
What is most notable about this provision for present purposes is that
the rights it grants run not only to the various means of obtaining property
(inherit, purchase, lease) but also to means of disposing of property (sell,
convey). Homeseekers are not just choosing where to live, they are also
choosing from whom they will and will not buy. And § 1982 seems to make
discriminatory purchase decisions just as actionable as discriminatory sales
decisions.176 It is hard to see how § 1982 would fail to apply, for example,
to a buyer who rejects an otherwise acceptable home sales transaction solely
because of the race of the seller.
It is not as obvious, however, that § 1982 provides a useful tool for
addressing choices to rule out entire areas based on their racial composition.
Choosing to buy in an all-white neighborhood greatly increases the odds of
buying from a white seller, and is thus likely to deprive a seller of a
different race of a sales transaction. But this outcome might seem to be
merely an incidental by-product of the neighborhood choice.177 Even a
househunter who is using explicitly racial criteria to choose a neighborhood
may be perfectly willing to purchase from a seller of a different race; one
might imagine that she primarily cares about the race of her would-be
neighbors, not the racial identity of her grantor. There are a couple of
172
Cf. Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1531 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[The Fair Housing Act] does
not impose liability . . . for failing to coordinate individual integrative acts that have an aggregate resegregative
effect”).
173
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968)
174
Section 1982 has also been interpreted to reach classifications that would have been thought of as racebased at the time of its enactment, and hence extends to discrimination based on national origin, ethnicity, and
religion. See e.g., Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617-18 (1987).
175
42 U.S.C. § 1982.
176
I thank Noah Zatz for discussions on this point.
177
That § 1982 presumably reaches only intentional discrimination sharpens this point. The Supreme Court
has limited the reach of parallel language in Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to intentional
discrimination, using reasoning that strongly suggests both provisions would be treated alike. Gen. Bldg.
Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 382-91 (1982). If finding a white seller were instead the reason
for seeking out the mostly white neighborhoods, then the fact that some sellers in the neighborhood are nonwhite
would not defeat a § 1982 claim for intentional discrimination. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)
(targeting of class of laundries due to prevalence of Chinese owners).
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responses to this point.
First, there is empirical evidence that the race of the seller or current
occupant of a housing unit does matter to homeseekers, whether as part of
the search heuristic or as an independent basis of discrimination.178 Analysis
of data from 1989-93 uncovered a surprising reluctance of white households
to move into housing units that had been vacated by black households—a
reluctance that appeared insensitive to numerous other factors about the
dwelling unit and the neighborhood in which it is located. 179 Although now
dated, these findings raise the possibility that African-American owneroccupants may be losing home sales based on their own racial identity, as
distinct from the neighborhood’s overall racial trends.180 More recent work
corroborates this interpretation. Respondents in a 2010 Bay Area study who
viewed images of the same home rated it less favorably if the sellers were
depicted as a black family rather than a similarly configured and attired
white family.181 Also suggestive is a 2014 working paper finding that black
landlords offering spaces on Airbnb receive lower rents than nonblack
landlords.182
Second, even if the buyer’s discrimination were directed solely at the
neighbors of the seller, and not at the seller herself, the seller still loses a
See ELLEN, supra note 6, at 140 (“To some extent, the race of the previous occupant may be viewed as a
clear proxy for the racial composition of the neighborhood. . . . But it is possible that the race of the departing
occupant signifies something in itself . . . ”); John R. Hipp, Segregation Through the Lens of Housing Unit
Transition: What Roles Do the Prior Residents, the Local Micro-Neighborhood, and the Broader Neighborhood
Play? 49 DEMOGRAPHY 1285, 1287 (2012) (positing “that prospective residents use the race/ethnicity of the
current residents in the unit as a signal that the neighborhood is appropriate for someone of their own
race/ethnicity”).
179
ELLEN, supra note 6, at 150 (describing the findings and concluding that “[t]he key implication is that
whites appear unwilling to enter black-vacated units, and few circumstances seem to change their minds”).
180
Specifically, white in-moving rates into black-vacated units appeared unaffected by “the growth in the
black population over the previous decade.” Id. at 150. See also Hipp, supra note 178 (using a data set that
followed turnover in housing units between 1985 and 1989 and between 1989 and 1993 to break apart the effect
of the race of the previous occupant from the racial composition of the immediately surrounding “microneighborhood” as well as that of the larger neighborhood, while controlling for numerous other factors). Hipp’s
study found that “the race/ethnicity of the prior residents had a strong effect on the race/ethnicity of the new
residents” and that this effect was observed “even when accounting for the racial/ethnic composition of the microneighborhood and the broader tract.” Id. at 1302. See also Brett Theodos et al., Housing Unit Turnover and the
Socioeconomic Mix of Low-Income Neighborhoods, 660 ANNALS OF THE AAPSS 117 (2015) (examining unit
turnover reflected between three waves of data covering 2002-03, 2005-06, and 2008-09). The primary focus of
the Theodos et al. study was stickiness in poverty status, of which they found substantial evidence, but they also
observed that “poverty status is more apt to change than is race/ethnicity of the occupants.” Id. at 125.
181
Courtney Marie Bonam, Devaluing Black Space: Black Locations as Targets of Housing and
Environmental Discrimination 34-46 & apps. C & D (unpublished dissertation, Stanford University, 2010)
available at https://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/8714877 ; see Michelle Wilde Anderson & Victoria C. Plaut,
Property Law: Implicit Bias and the Resilience of Spatial Colorlines, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW
(Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith, eds., 2012) (discussing this study and other work by Bonam and her
colleagues). Even when prior residents do not directly interact with potential in-movers, they typically have an
opportunity to view the housing unit, where “many possible clues might tip them off about the race/ethnicity of
the current owners” – including family photos displayed in the home. Hipp, supra note 178, at 1288.
182
Benjamin G. Edelman and Michael Luca, Digital Discrimination: The Case of Airbnb.com (January 10,
2014), Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper No. 14-054, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2377353 (finding racial discrimination against Airbnb landlords, with equivalent rentals
from a nonblack host commanding 12% higher rents on average).
178
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sale due to intentional racial discrimination. Where the seller is of the same
race as the discriminated-against parties, it seems a bit artificial to absolve
the buyer of liability on the ground that she only meant to discriminate
against the neighbors. The idea of “transferred intent” in tort law provides a
useful analogy: a defendant cannot escape liability for the intentional tort of
battery by asserting that he meant to batter a different person instead. 183 If
African-American homesellers are losing sales because white homebuyers
are avoiding their neighborhoods based on the race of the residents, those
sellers are being deprived of equal chances to transact over property based
on their race. This conclusion seems especially compelling where past
discrimination makes it very likely that African-American homesellers will
be selling homes within predominantly African-American neighborhoods.
A 1973 Seventh Circuit decision, Clark v. Universal Builders,184
embraced an analogously broad reading of § 1982. There, the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants exploited a “dual housing market” by selling
homes in African-American neighborhoods for higher prices and on less
favorable terms than comparable homes in white areas. The defendants
contended that they did not violate § 1982 because they did not offer
different terms to buyers of different races for the same homes. But the
Seventh Circuit found it an unrealistic dodge for defendants to assert “that
they would have sold on the same terms to those whites who elected to
enter the black market and to purchase housing in the ghetto and segregated
inner-city neighborhoods at exorbitant prices, far in excess of prices for
comparable homes in the white market.”185 Similar skepticism might attach
to a househunter’s assertion that she would be perfectly willing to purchase
from any black homeseller that she happened to encounter within an
otherwise all-white neighborhood.
Many hurdles to employing this approach remain, however. If AfricanAmerican sellers are avoided en masse through neighborhood choice rather
than one at a time, there may be no identifiable victim of discrimination.
Even if this obstacle can be surmounted through organizational standing or
standing premised on the injuries of segregation, pinpointing the behavior
that caused these injuries remains problematic.186 Data may establish that
183

See, e.g., Keel v. Hainline, 331 P.2d 397 (Okla. 1958); cf. Kerri Lynn Stone, Ricci Glitch? The
Unexpected Appearance of Transferred Intent in Title VII, 55 LOY. L. REV. 751 (2009).
184
501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 95 S. Ct. 657 (1974).
185
Id at 331. On appeal after remand (Clark II), the Seventh Circuit upheld a judgment for the defendant
based on the district court’s findings that homes in question (located, respectively, in suburban Deerfield, Illinois
and on Chicago’s South Side) were not in fact comparable and that plaintiffs had failed to explain how defendants
could have charged excessive prices in a market that appeared to be a competitive one. Clark v. Universal
Builders, 706 F.2d 204 (7th Cir. 1983) (Clark II). Nonetheless, Clark I’s insistence on taking a realistic view of
the ways in which discrimination has shaped the landscape that actors encounter, when coupled with § 1982’s
embrace of both sides of property transactions, could provide a potential doctrinal hook for reaching
discriminatory homeseeking.
186
Organizational standing is permitted in FHA cases but lower courts are divided on whether it is available
in § 1982 cases. ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION § 27:17 (Westlaw).
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white buyers are failing to buy from black sellers at rates that are higher
than can be explained through other factors, but there may be no way to
determine which specific transactions featured discrimination.187
Nonetheless, the discussion above suggests that § 1982 would be
available in instances where proof of discriminatory intent is available—for
example, where a homeseeker is found to have rejected a prospective seller
or landlord based on race. Evidence of such discriminatory intent might be
found in some of the same places that one might look for violations of the
FHA: in advertising, statements, and interactions with realtors.188
B. Reaching Collateral Search Conduct
The discussion above suggests that the FHA contains no clear way to
reach the actual decisions of biased homeseekers as a conceptual matter,
while § 1982 offers a conceptual path that may be largely unavailable for
practical or proof reasons. But might the two be combined in some manner?
One possibility has already been mentioned: that certain collateral acts that
are regulated by the FHA—advertising, statements, and assisted search—
could constitute evidence of a homeseeker’s § 1982 violation. But the fact
that § 1982 reaches biased homeseeking can also be used to buttress direct
liability for collateral search behavior under the FHA itself.
As I explain below, the FHA can be fairly read to reach certain forms of
collateral search conduct. To be sure, the law has not previously been read
in this way;189 indeed, HUD has made some contrary interpretative
moves.190 But those interpretations, I posit, were likely driven by
constitutional or conceptual concerns with reading the FHA to reach
collateral conduct relating to legal underlying acts.191 They may also have
been supported by an assumption that the biased decisions of buyers and
tenants can have no real effect on fair housing. Both the practical effect of
Questions concerning standing in the FHA context, including the issue of causation, are currently pending review
before the U.S. Supreme Court. See City of Miami v. Wells Fargo, 801 F.3d 1258 (11 th Cir. 2015) and City of
Miami v. Bank of America, 800 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. granted and cases consolidated, 84 USLW 3500
(2016).
187
Disparate impact analysis is often capable of reaching practices that statistically cause status-related
harm, even when it is impossible to identify the particular cases in which status produced the result. See generally
Zatz, supra note 117. But this approach only works when there is some party producing aggregate results through
a practice or policy, not when many individuals are separately making their own decisions, only some of which
involve discrimination.
188
Cf. Schwemm, supra note 148, at 251-55 (discussing evidentiary use of discriminatory statements in
establishing violations of other sections of the FHA).
189
I am not aware of any court interpreting the law in this way, nor have I seen any scholarly support for
such an interpretation. See, e.g., Seicshnaydre, supra note 3, at 1003-04 (quickly rejecting the possibility §
3604(c) could apply to homeseeking, asserting that it, like § 3604(d), “do[es] not contemplate third parties”).
190
See infra Parts III.C and D.
191
As noted above, there might be First Amendment concerns with regulating speech beyond the ambit of
substantive prohibitions—but these concerns would not apply when the underlying conduct is illegal. See supra
note 148 and accompanying text.
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biased homeseeking behavior and the legal status of the underlying conduct
must be rethought in light of the analysis above. There is no doctrinal
impediment to reaching collateral or assistive acts that abet discrimination
that is both illegal and harmful.
Homeseekers are typically viewed as outside the FHA’s ambit because
they are not thought to be erecting or policing any barriers to housing
access; they are merely trying to navigate them like everyone else. Yet the
“barriers” metaphor misleadingly treats the set of housing opportunities as
exogenously given, as if we need only make actors step out of the way or
remove race-based filters from their doorsteps. Where the housing choice
set is constrained by discriminatory homeseeking heuristics, those heuristics
become barriers that are no less real than those erected by housing
providers. Achieving the integrative purpose of the FHA, recently
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, requires attention to both demand-side
and supply-side impediments to that goal.
C. Advertising and Statements
Section 3604(c) of the FHA makes it illegal “[t]o make, print, or
publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice, statement, or
advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates
any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race [or other
protected status], or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or
discrimination.” The limiting language “with respect to the sale or rental of
a dwelling” has been interpreted to rule out “stray remarks” or social
commentary about living patterns.192 But nothing in the advertising and
statement prohibition specifies which side of a transaction the speaker or
advertiser must stand on. Thus, homeseekers who state preferences based
on race in connection with buying or renting a dwelling seem to fall under
the literal language of § 3604(c), just as sellers and landlords plainly do.
It does not appear, however, that HUD or the courts have read § 3604(c)
to reach homeseeker communications. HUD’s regulation on advertising and
statements repeats the statutory prohibitions and then adds the following
proviso: “The prohibitions in this section shall apply to all written or oral
notices or statements by a person engaged in the sale or rental of a
dwelling.”193 Purchasers and tenants are arguably “engaged” in a sale or
rental of a dwelling when they negotiate or sign a contract or lease, but the
language fits them less well than supply-side housing providers. Moreover,
the next section of the regulation, although expressly nonexhaustive,

192
193

See Schwemm, supra note 148, at 215.
24 C.F.R. 100.75(b) (emphasis added).
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provides examples that seem to focus on supply-side discrimination.194
HUD also produced a letter and memorandum in the mid-1990s
indicating that ads in which homeseekers describe their own characteristics
would not be reachable by the FHA.195 Notably, such self-describing ads,
when engaged in by housing providers, have been held to violate § 3604(c).
For example, a landlord’s advertisement of a unit for rent in a “white home”
produced liability for both the landlord and the newspaper that published
the ad.196 Just as a self-describing landlord indicates a preference for a
tenant who shares the stated characteristic, tenants and buyers who describe
their own characteristics are plausibly signaling preferences for those
characteristics in landlords, sellers, or neighbors.
Alternatively, a tenant or buyer might express a “limitation” based on
protected status within the meaning of the statute simply by representing to
sellers or landlords that the proposed transaction will be with a person
whose characteristics match the specified ones—thereby facilitating
discrimination by housing providers. Interestingly, HUD issued its guidance
despite expressly recognizing this risk.197 Such self-describing ads, if
sufficiently prevalent, could allow landlords to fill their units with those
who match their preferred profile without ever having to run a
discriminatory ad or turn away people who show up to look at the unit.
These concerns have only been sharpened by the ways in which
technology has altered the process for matching up homeseekers and homes.
The one-to-many model of communication exemplified by the print
newspaper ad has been supplanted by the many-to-many communications
that widespread internet use facilitates—ones in which buyers and tenants
as well as sellers and landlords can initiate housing matches. Those seeking
housing can at trivial cost post information about their own characteristics
or the characteristics that they seek in landlords, neighbors, or housemates.
Reaching these ads and statements is a move that is well supported by the
FHA’s text and purpose.
D. Assisted Search: Agents and Apps
Homeseekers often receive assistance from others in carrying out
searches. I will consider here two forms of assistive technologies: the
194

24 C.F.R. 100.75(c).
See Nelson Diaz, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of General Counsel,
undated letter (opining that ads in which homeseekers describe themselves along protected dimensions did not
violate the Act); Sarah Pratt, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Memo dated July 25, 1996 (stating
this conclusion and promising future guidance on the issue). The text of both the Diaz letter and the Pratt memo is
available
at
National
Fair
Housing
Advocate
Online,
http://www.fairhousing.com/index.cfm?method=page.display&pagename=HUD_resources_advmemo.
The
additional guidance promised in the Pratt memo does not appear to have materialized.
196
United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 1972).
197
See Diaz, supra note 195.
195
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employment of real estate professionals; and the use of apps or other online
interfaces to structure search. In both cases, I will consider both the
potential liability of the homeseeker making use of such assistance to carry
out biased searches, and the possible liability of the provider of such
assistance (the real estate agent, app creator, or website provider). As in the
case of advertisements and statements, the prohibitions contained in § 1982
help to buttress causes of action that relate to these sorts of assisted search.
Where the underlying conduct is illegal, it makes little sense to exempt
actions directed at abetting it, if they otherwise fall within the coverage of
the text and would undermine the FHA’s purposes if left unchecked.
1. Real Estate Professionals
Consider first the possibility that homeseekers could incur liability
based on biased statements or instructions given to real estate agents.
Significantly, § 3604(c) applies to both oral and written statements “with
respect to sale or rental of a dwelling.”198 If that prohibition were read to
reach homeseeker communications, it could reach statements made to real
estate agents, including requests to exclude homes from consideration based
on racial criteria. Such a statement would fall within the textual prohibition
because it “indicates [a] preference, limitation, or discrimination based on
race” if it is sufficiently targeted to constitute a statement made “with
respect to sale or rental of a dwelling.”199
Significantly, HUD’s regulation on discriminatory ads and statements
explicitly prohibits “[e]xpressing to agents, brokers, employees, prospective
sellers or renters or any other persons a preference for or limitation on any
purchaser or renter because of race [or other protected status].”200 While this
provision addresses discrimination against purchasers and renters, not
sellers or landlords, it nonetheless shows that instructions to a realtor
represent the kinds of statements that can, in HUD’s view, run afoul of the
FHA. Under the analysis in the preceding section, however, there is no
textual, constitutional, or purpose-based reason to treat homeseekers any
differently under § 3604(c) than landlords and sellers are already treated.201
See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. 100.75(b) (“The prohibitions in this section shall apply to all written or oral notices or
statements by a person engaged in the sale or rental of a dwelling.”); Jancik v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing and Urban
Development, 44 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that a landlord’s comments and questions over the phone to a
prospective tenant violated § 3604(c)).
199
Much of what homeseekers say about their prospective searches would likely fall beyond the narrow
confines of “with respect to sale or rental of a dwelling.” See Schwemm, supra note 148, at 215 (citing cases in
which § 3604(c) was found inapplicable because the statements in question were not tied to a specific transaction
involving a dwelling). But some very targeted comments and instructions to realtors could be related tightly
enough to the sale or rental of a dwelling to potentially generate liability.
200
24 C.F.R. 100.75(c)(2).
201
The issue of enforcement remains, though the difficulty is not unique to homeseeker statements; it is just
as hard to imagine how the prohibition on discriminatory statements that sellers or landlords make to agents could
be enforced. Even if enforcement were wholly absent, however, making the conduct illegal could carry significant
198
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Consider next the potential liability of real estate professionals who
solicit or follow race-based househunting instructions. Real estate agents
are covered by the general prohibitions on discrimination found in § 3604
of the Fair Housing Act, including 3604(a), and thus may not “otherwise
make unavailable or deny . . . a dwelling.” This language plainly reaches
racial steering, in which a real estate professional selectively chooses
properties to show based on the race of her clients, even if her actions are
based on her own assumptions (accurate or not) about their preferences for
neighborhood racial composition. But what if the client actually expresses a
preference and the agent merely carries it out, so that the agent cannot be
said to have made any dwelling unavailable to that client? Here, it becomes
relevant that § 3605(a) separately provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose
business includes engaging in residential real estate-related
transactions to discriminate against any person in making
available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions of
such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin.202
Section 3605(b) defines “residential real estate-related transaction[s]” to
include not only loans and other financial transactions related to real estate,
but also “the selling, brokering, and appraising of residential real
property.”203 Although § 3605 appears to be rarely invoked in cases
involving the conduct of real estate agents,204 the usual meaning of “selling”
and “brokering” would readily encompass the work of real estate agents.205
Significantly, § 3605’s statutory language contains no indication that
only buyers and tenants, and not sellers and landlords, are capable of being
deprived of transactions based on race. Textually, the issue boils down to
whether the “any person” that a covered party may not discriminate against
includes only the agent’s own actual and potential clients and those
counterparties who happen to be consumers of housing, or also potential
counterparties to the transactions in which a realtor’s own clients will
expressive force that might prove valuable in changing search norms. See infra note 230 and accompanying text.
The underlying illegality of the discriminatory instructions would also rule out a defense for real estate agents
who follow such instructions—that they are merely satisfying the entirely legal preferences of a housing customer.
See text accompanying notes 206-215, infra.
202
42 U.S.C. § 3605(a).
203
42 U.S.C. § 3605(b).
204
This omission may be due to the broadly applicable set of prohibitions in § 3604, which fit better with the
usual steering case. But because § 3604 may not apply to homeseeker discrimination for the reasons already
discussed, § 3605 could do independent work in addressing buyer-initiated discrimination.
205
See 24 C.F.R. 100.20 (“Broker or Agent includes any person authorized to perform an action on behalf of
another person regarding any matter related to the sale or rental of dwellings, including offers, solicitations or
contracts and the administration of matters regarding such offers, solicitations or contracts or any residential real
estate-related transactions.”).
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engage as purchasers or tenants. If no one is to be discriminated against in
the availability of transactions (as the phrase “any person” would seem to
suggest), then it is hard to see why the prohibition would not reach agents
who assist clients in carrying out racially discriminatory home searches.
There is some contrary authority on this point, albeit not based on a
reading of § 3605. A 1990 Seventh Circuit decision authored by Judge
Posner, Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, indicated that a buyer’s broker who
was merely satisfying her discriminatory customer’s preferences would not
be liable under the Fair Housing Act, since housing customers were
presumed to be the beneficiaries, and not the targets, of the statute.206
Although recognizing that the biased decisions of homebuyers could have a
cumulative impact on housing patterns, Judge Posner opined that it was not
up to brokers “to solve [this] collective-action problem.”207
In 1996, HUD wrestled with the same issue.208 Initially, HUD Assistant
Secretary Elizabeth Julian responded in the negative when asked whether a
buyer’s agent would violate the Fair Housing Act if she complied with a
client’s race-based search instructions.209 She followed up this response
with a second letter suggesting such conduct would be unethical and
imprudent, even if not illegal.210 After significant pushback,211 Julian
retracted the initial letter212 and promised to follow up with “comprehensive
206
Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1530 (7th Cir. 1990) (“The statute prohibits real estate
agents from refusing to show properties because of the race of the customer, or misleading the customer about the
availability of properties because of his race, or cajoling or coercing the customer because of his race to buy this
property or that or look in this community rather than that.”); see id. at 1531 (“[T]he broker who responds to the
[buyer’s] desires . . . is not discriminating against the customer, or denying the customer a dwelling, or
misrepresenting to the customer the unavailability of a dwelling”). Like most steering cases, Bellwood focuses on
3604 and does not mention § 3605.
207
Id. at 1530.
208
It did so in a series of communications from then-HUD Assistant Secretary Elizabeth Julian, which have
been collected online by the National Fair Housing Advocate Online. See NFHAO, The Buyer’s Agent Issue,
http://www.fairhousing.com/index.cfm?method=page.display&pagename=HUD_resources_buyers_agent .
209
Letter from HUD Assistant Secretary Elizabeth Julian to Jill Levine dated Oct. 2, 1996, available at
http://www.fairhousing.com/index.cfm?method=page.display&pagename=HUD_resources_buyers_agent#Initial
%20HUD%20Buyer%27s%20Agent%20letter (stating that subject to some provisos, “a buyer's agent would not
violate the Act merely by mutely accommodating the client's request to limit, on a protected class basis, the search
for dwellings”).
210
Letter from HUD Assistant Secretary Elizabeth Julian to Jill Levine (undated, responding to Levine’s
letter dated Oct. 28, 1996) http://www.fairhousing.com/index.cfm?method=page.display&pagename
=HUD_resources_buyers_agent#Second%20HUD%20Buyer%27s%20Agent%20Letter (“In short, from the
standpoint of legally prudent, as well as ethical, considerations, I would strongly advise against any agent or
broker . . . accommodating a request that a housing search be limited based on race, or other protected-class terms.
The fact that Section 804(a) of the Fair Housing Act may, under limited circumstances, not prohibit such
accommodation does not make it right, does not make it ethical, and it is not the policy of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development to endorse such conduct.”).
211
See Letter from Aurie Pennick to HUD Assistant Secretary Elizabeth Julian, dated Nov. 8, 1996
http://www.fairhousing.com/index.cfm?method=page.display&pagename=HUD_resources_buyers_agent#Aurie
%20Pennick%27s%20response%20to%20the%20HUD%20Buyer%20Agent%20letters (stating that Julian’s Oct
2, 1996 letter “was received with shock and dismay by fair housing advocates and many real estate professionals”
and asserting that the guidance given in it was “unhelpful, illogical, and even dangerous”).
212
Letter from HUD Assistant Secretary Elizabeth Julian to Aurie Pennick, dated Dec. 3, 1996
http://www.fairhousing.com/index.cfm?method=page.display&pagename=HUD_resources_buyers_agent#HUD%
20final%20Buyer%27s%20Agent%20letter%20%28response%20to%20Aurie%20Pennick%29 (“In light of the
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guidance” on the point,213 a promise that seems to have gone unfulfilled.214
An assumption underlying these existing analyses is that homeseekers
themselves could never be held liable for undertaking discriminatory
searches or making discriminatory housing decisions. But that assumption
is both inaccurate and irrelevant. It is inaccurate given the analysis above
about the reach of § 1982. It is irrelevant because the law already
uncontroversially extends greater duties in cases where real estate agents are
employed than it does when parties to real estate transactions act alone. For
example, the single-family homeowner exception does not apply if the
owner uses an agent, and the agent himself could be liable in that scenario
as well.215
Moreover, as the earlier discussion of autonomy suggested,
homeseekers have no plausible normative claim to compel others to help
them realize discriminatory preferences about their neighbors—at least no
claim that would be consistent with existing understandings of fair housing
law. Well-settled understandings of antidiscrimination law already constrain
parties to act in ways that may thwart the strongly held desires of housing
consumers for racial homogeneity. Just as an employer cannot refuse to hire
women simply because customers dislike working with women, 216 a
landlord cannot ban people of a particular race or religion simply because
most of the landlord’s other current or prospective tenants do not like living
near people of that race or religion. Likewise, a real estate agent cannot
steer customers away from a given neighborhood in order to satisfy the
racial preferences of current residents or the prospective biases of future
homeseekers in that area.217
These prohibitions thus already operate to effectively withdraw
discriminatory prerogatives from both residents and prospective
obvious ‘slippery slope’ down which my letter has apparently invited some to slide, and my agreement with you
that my letter sent the ‘wrong message,’ I have decided to rescind the October 2, 1996 letter, as you requested, and
develop comprehensive guidance that will address the issue more broadly”).
213
Id.
214
See Hannah v. Sibcy Cline Realtors, 769 N.E.2d 876, 885 (Ohio, 2001) (noting that the promised
guidance never materialized).
215
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3603(b)(1), 3605. Similarly, the Mrs. Murphy exception only creates an exemption
from § 3604 (with the exception of § 3604(c)). See 42 U.S.C. § 3603. Thus, if Mrs. Murphy hired a realtor, that
person could presumably be held liable for discrimination under § 3605, even though Mrs. Murphy would not
herself be liable under the FHA for engaging in the same discrimination.
216
See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 686 (2001)
(“Title VII forbids employers to refuse to hire female candidates to work with particular customers even though
those customers would be highly reluctant to work with a woman.”); Kelman, supra note 120, at 848 (“As a
matter of positive law, it is clearly the case that an employer cannot refuse to hire as a result of such racist or
sexist customer preferences.”).
217
The Bellwood court acknowledged this point, 895 F.2d at 1530 (“A person who serves as a conduit for
another person's discrimination can, it is true, be guilty of intentional discrimination, or, what is the same thing, of
disparate treatment.”). However, the court distinguished cases in which a realtor steers her homebuying client
away from a neighborhood based on the preferences of other potential customers in that neighborhood or follows
the instructions of a selling client not to show the home (both of which are clearly impermissible) from a case in
which the realtor facilitates the racial preferences of her own homebuying client. Id. at 1530-31.
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homeseekers.218 It seems odd to rule out what merely amounts to an
additional way of withdrawing discriminatory prerogatives from
homeseekers: forbidding agents from following categorical race-based
instructions from homeseekers.219 There are also practical difficulties in
separating agents’ acts directed at catering to the racial preferences they
expect homeseekers to have (clearly forbidden) from those that merely carry
out the expressed racial preferences of homeseekers. Moreover, the fact that
a broker’s other potential clients have preferences about racial composition
in their current or prospective neighborhoods may influence the way that
the broker responds to the race-based preferences that are stated by her
househunting clients. Agents, as repeat players who work both sides of the
fence, may have a financial interest in the content of buyer preferences. At
the very least, there is the appearance of a conflict of interest when agents
are involved in processing and carrying out racially biased search
instructions.
Many real estate agents wisely refuse to embroil themselves in
furthering the discriminatory preferences of their clients. They may instead
suggest that the clients themselves identify neighborhoods of interest,
without the broker providing information about the racial composition of
the area. Agents might, however, increasingly recommend apps or data
sources that will enable homeseekers to identify neighborhoods that meet
their criteria.220 This trend raises the stakes for the treatment of those
technologies, a topic I turn to now.
2. Apps and Interactive Online Tools
Could an app designed to simplify search, or a homeseeker’s use of such
an app, violate fair housing law? The Fair Housing Act predated, and thus
does not speak directly to, the use of apps and other online interfaces. But
new ways of carrying out prohibited acts can plainly be reached by
antidiscrimination law, provided there is no countervailing law on the
books. For example, it is uncontroversial that landlords and sellers who post
discriminatory ads on the internet are liable under the Fair Housing Act,
even though the Communications Decency Act limits the liability of
internet service providers who do nothing more than serve as conduits for

218
Cf. Kelman, supra note 120, at 848 (suggesting that antidiscrimination law binds customers to refrain
from discrimination, even though this restriction is enforced through constraints placed on the employer).
219
See id. (describing employers as agents or intermediaries for customers through whom antidiscrimination
law can be enforced); see also Mark Kelman, Defining the Antidiscrimination Norm to Defend It, 43 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 735, 758-59 (2006) (arguing that the customers of a business are the “true employers” to whom the
antidiscrimination norm should be understood to extend).
220
See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 51 (reporting on a broker’s belief that providing demographic data directly to
clients would violate fair housing laws, leading her to instead recommend apps that will provide the same data).
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these discriminatory ads.221
Providers of interactive tools that elicit information about protected
characteristics from homeseekers or facilitate the filtering of applicants for
housing based those characteristics can also incur liability under § 3604(c).
In an earlier branch of the Roommate.com litigation, the Ninth Circuit held
that an online interface that prompts users to specify preferences
corresponding to protected statuses could run afoul of the Fair Housing
Act’s advertising provision, notwithstanding the immunity offered to
internet service providers by the Communications Decency Act. 222 Of
course, that interface elicited preferences from those who were offering
housing, not those who were seeking it. But if § 3604(c) were found to
apply to homeseeking, as suggested above, the seeker/provider distinction
would disappear. Both the person using the interface to restrict search based
on racial criteria and the website provider enabling this functionality could
be potentially liable.
Consider an online tool or mobile app that aggregated information about
the races of sellers or landlords and permitted users to filter listings on this
basis. § 3604(c) liability could be triggered by the statements or preferences
communicated by the user to the application.223 Even if such an interface
were deemed too attenuated from any particular sale or rental to generate
liability under § 3604(c), a homeseeker’s use of such a tool could provide
proof of a § 1982 violation in withdrawing opportunities for sales and rental
transactions from individuals based on race.224 Such an app could be readily
distinguished from tools that enable homeseekers (and others) to learn about
neighborhood conditions, including racial composition.225 Because data on
neighborhood racial composition could be used in any number of valid,
nondiscriminatory ways—from assessing changes in neighborhoods over
time to reassuring homeseekers that they were making integrative rather
than segregative moves—there are compelling normative reasons to resist
restricting access to such information.226
221
See Chicago Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law v. Craigslist, 519 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir.
2008) (“Using the remarkably candid postings on craigslist, the Lawyers’ Committee can identify many targets to
investigate. It can dispatch testers and collect damages from any landlord or owner who engages in
discrimination.”).
222
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157 (9 th Cir. 2008) (en
banc). The specific ruling became moot when the Ninth Circuit later ruled that roommates are not making
decisions about “dwellings” and hence fall outside the FHA entirely. But its holding remains relevant for
situations that do not involve shared housing.
223
Cf. Jancik v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Development, 44 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding
that a landlord’s question about race can, in context, violate § 3604(c)).
224
Cf. Schwemm, supra note 148, at 251-55 (discussing evidentiary use of discriminatory ads and
statements).
225
A more difficult intermediate case, which I will return to below, would be an app that not only informs
about racial composition but also enables categorical screening of listings on that basis. See text accompanying
notes 242-244, infra.
226
Indeed, HUD itself is making rich and detailed racial data and an associated mapping tool publicly
available as part of its new approach to affirmatively furthering fair housing. See HUD, Affirmatively Furthering
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A particularly interesting set of questions is raised by the prospect of
interactive tools that would allow households to coordinate their home
selection decisions with each other, without involving a developer, landlord,
or realtor. For example, groups of in-movers could coordinate in virtual
space, privately, to enter a new or redeveloping community. If such tools
are not already available it seems inevitable they soon will be. Indeed, a
recent novel set in Detroit had what one character termed “a Groupon model
of gentrification” as a primary plot element. 227 What should the role of law
be with respect to such coordination?
On one hand, housing coordination of this sort is merely a scaled up and
high tech version of the kinds of decisions that homeseekers already
make—and which are widely viewed as immune from legal action. On the
other, coordinated action might seem like a larger threat to housing access.
Even if disconnected individual decisions lie beyond the law, efforts to
coordinate those decisions might not. Such coordinated action could make
dwellings unavailable under § 3604(a). Moreover, some interactive tools
designed to coordinate behavior could violate § 3604(e), the FHA’s antiblockbusting provision, which makes it unlawful “[f]or profit, to induce or
attempt to induce any person to sell or rent any dwelling by representations
regarding the entry or prospective entry into the neighborhood of a person
or persons of a particular race [or other protected status].”228 An app that
merely predicted future racial trends would not be attempting to induce
anyone to sell or rent, but a for-profit coordination platform that
prominently included racial data might seem to do exactly that.
Reaching coordination tools, however, would be a double-edged sword.
As this paper’s analysis has suggested, the existing uncoordinated patterns
of homeseeking decisions already pose a serious threat to fair housing, if a
largely unrecognized one. If it is more difficult to achieve integrated
outcomes through unguided and fragmented individual choices than it is to
perpetuate segregated outcomes through those same dispersed choices,
cracking down on mechanisms for coordinating and guiding choice could
run counter to the project of advancing integration. This point bears on
doctrine to the extent that the integrative purpose of the FHA informs
interpretation of its provisions.
Regardless of the state of current law, apps bring another actor onto the
scene (the app designer) who could be the subject of legal and policy
Fair Housing, Assessment Tool, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/affht_pt.html#affhassess-tab. While it is possible
this information might be used for discriminatory purposes as well as worthy ones, its capacity to identify and
address segregation makes it valuable on balance. I thank Nestor Davidson for comments on this point.
227
BENJAMIN MARKOVITS, YOU DON’T HAVE TO LIVE LIKE THIS (2015). In the novel, a developer served
as a coordinator and appeared to have the power to select which groups would actually receive blocks of houses,
but it is easy to imagine models in which groups and individuals could go to a website to coordinate blocks of
proposed purchases.
228
42 U.S.C. § 3604(e).
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directives. Certain kinds of functionality that would tend to produce a
segregative effect might be analyzed under disparate impact analysis, as I
will discuss below, although a robust nondiscriminatory interest in the free
availability and use of data would strictly limit this avenue. Nonetheless,
there may be other ways in which these new data tools could be addressed
to advance fair housing. Most notably, the affirmatively further mandate
might include incentives for innovative apps that would help to debias
search and advance integration.229
IV. SHIFTING COSTS
Although the approach detailed in Part III would break new doctrinal
ground and carry considerable expressive force, it would likely make only
limited inroads into closing the search gap.230 Consistent with the normative
constraints outlined in Part II, it would preserve a realm of decisional
autonomy in which bias could operate unchecked. The associated costs
must be borne by someone—whether those who find their housing
opportunities diminished due to their protected status, or other parties who
are in a position to bear or mitigate those costs. This Part explores some of
the ways that these costs might be shifted among parties.
A. Theories and Limits
The Fair Housing Act contains two powerful doctrinal levers for
shifting the costs of biased homeseeking: the disparate impact cause of
action, and the mandate to “affirmatively further” fair housing. Each of
these potential avenues for closing the search gap will be explored in more
detail below. Notably, however, even legal prohibitions on disparate
treatment shift some costs associated with biased search. For example,
landlords, developers, and real estate agents are not permitted to
discriminate based on protected status even when placed under great
financial pressure to do so by other prospective tenants, buyers, or
clients.231 Legal compliance in these situations can mean forfeiting
income.232 Prohibitions on such customer-catering discrimination can be
understood not only as a means of effectively overriding certain consumer
229

See infra Part IV.C.2.
The effect is difficult to predict because a change in search norms could yield more significant results
than might be expected based on enforcement prospects alone. See generally MCADAMS, supra note 79
(examining the power of the law to communicate norms and enable people to coordinate their behavior, even in
the absence of enforcement); see also Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 3, at 44-45 (suggesting that even a difficult-toenforce legal change could carry expressive force and influence norms). Whatever the size of the response, any
decrease in discriminatory conduct on the part of homeseekers will reduce the costs that other parties must bear as
a result of such conduct.
231
See supra notes 216-217.
232
Cf. Jolls, supra note 216, at 686-87 (making this point in the employment context).
230
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preferences, then, but also as a technology for shifting costs associated with
certain forms of homeseeker discrimination onto housing providers and
brokers.
Disparate impact and the affirmatively further mandate offer more overt
means of reallocating bias-related costs. Biased search heuristics factor into
these theories in two ways, supplying both a “why” and a “how.” First, the
existence of discriminatory homeseeking and its effects in perpetuating
segregation provide a rationale for compensatory efforts, as well as a basis
for rebutting the notion that optimal integration levels have already been
achieved. Second, a focus on search tactics provides substantive guidance
about the shape that such corrective efforts might take.
Efforts to promote integration can come under fire for being too
aggressive as well as for being too anemic.233 Race-conscious efforts to
influence cumulative homeseeker decisions, as through integration
maintenance programs directed at addressing tipping dynamics, confront
legal barriers.234 And in Inclusive Communities, the majority expressed
wariness about (although it did not completely rule out) the possibility of
race-conscious remedies for disparate impact violations.235 Nonetheless, the
affirmatively further mandate, along with the Court’s recognition of the Fair
Housing Act’s goal of integration in connection with its disparate impact
analysis, offer potential hooks for supporting (or at least not outlawing) a
variety of cost-shifting approaches.
B. Disparate Impact
The disparate impact cause of action, recently recognized by the
Supreme Court in Inclusive Communities, offers one avenue for shifting the
costs of biased search onto parties who are in a good position to bear or
mitigate them.236 Although disparate impact is at least partly justified by its
ability to “smoke out” intentional discrimination that is simply too difficult
to prove,237 in prototypical form it reaches conduct that is both facially
neutral and neutral in intent. Neutral policies can have a discriminatory
233
Cf. Saul Levmore, The Mortgage Crisis and Affirmative Action, Sept. 3, 2007,
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2007/09/mortgage-crisis.html (discussing settings involving “regulation
from two directions”).
234
See, e.g., United States v. Starrett City, 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988) (striking down an integration
maintenance plan as violative of the Fair Housing Act).
235
See Inclusive Communities, 135 S.Ct. at 2524-25.
236
Because the disparate impact cause of action has been recognized for decades by courts of appeals, see,
e.g., Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2525, there has already been considerable experience with some of these
approaches.
237
See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 120, at 891 n.86 (“Certainly, one use of disparate impact law is to smoke
out ‘canonical’ disparate treatment, to forbid seemingly neutral practices that were actually put into place in order
to exclude people because of status.”); Inclusive Communities, 135 S.Ct. at 2522 (“Recognition of disparateimpact liability under the FHA also plays a role in uncovering discriminatory intent: It permits plaintiffs to
counteract unconscious prejudices and disguised animus that escape easy classification as disparate treatment.”).
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effect if they reach factors that correlate with protected group status. Often
those correlations are produced by intentional discrimination by actors
whose conduct is, for whatever reason, not readily reachable by law.238
Consider Griggs v. Duke Power,239 the case that held disparate impact
claims to be cognizable under Title VII. There, the screening administered
by the employer (tests and a high school graduation requirement) yielded
disparate results that tracked racial lines due to past racial discrimination,
whether in the schools or elsewhere. Of course, many of the AfricanAmerican job applicants who failed the screen did so for reasons unrelated
to their race just as many white applicants failed the screen, but it is a
statistical certainty that some of the black applicants were disadvantaged
because of race.240 The disparate impact cause of action does not ask for
these past causal chains to be untangled, but rather requires that a less
discriminatory alternative be put in place if one is available.
In the housing context, certain choices of public and private actors
interact with homeseeker biases to produce results that entrench
segregation. Challenging those choices through disparate impact analysis
offers a way of ameliorating the impacts of homeseeker choices. For
example, changes in zoning classifications that catalyze rapid and
concentrated gentrification while constraining the production of housing in
other neighborhoods can be challenged based on the predicted interaction
with homeseeker choices. Disparate impact analysis has already been used
to challenge, with some success, decisions about the location of affordable
housing or the permissibility of different categories of housing stock in a
given municipality.241
There are other, less familiar ways in which disparate impact claims
might be used to address or backfill the search gap. For example, disparate
impact analysis might be used to evaluate search practices facilitated by
particular data manipulation tools. Suppose an app were created that
allowed users to filter real estate listings based on maximum percentages of
households of a particular race residing within a certain radius of the
property. Further, suppose it were shown that widespread use of this type of
tool within a particular geographic area tended to perpetuate patterns of
segregative housing choices—a type of discriminatory effect recognized by
both HUD and the Supreme Court as supporting a disparate impact claim.
238
This is not to suggest that identifying such prior discrimination is a prerequisite to liability—plainly it is
not. In the contexts of sex and disability, for example, liability can be imposed based on differences that were not
due to anyone’s discrimination. See Zatz, supra note 117, at 34-35
239
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
240
See Zatz, supra note 117, at 27-32.
241
See Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An Appellate Analysis of Forty
Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 63 AM U. L. REV. 357 (2013) (analyzing and
collecting data on the use of disparate impact analysis in different categories of cases, including ones involving
“housing barriers” such as exclusionary zoning).
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Of course, showing a discriminatory effect is just the first step in
making out such a claim: under the burden-shifting approach adapted from
Griggs, the defendant has an opportunity to present a valid
nondiscriminatory reason for the policy or practice, which the plaintiff then
must show can be achieved through a less discriminatory alternative.242
The fact that data tools might be used to support integrative as well as
segregative housing searches provides a nondiscriminatory reason for
offering and employing such a tool. But a less discriminatory alternative
than enabling users to place “ceilings” on particular groups might be an app
that allowed users to specify minimum percentages of a particular race,
perhaps capped at 50% or 60%. Such an approach would allow some ingroup clustering as well as integrationist efforts without supporting searches
for segregated areas.243 It would not keep people from using data to find
more segregated neighborhoods if they wished to do so, but it would keep
doing so from being a routinized and potentially focal practice.
An app like the fictitious Tiebout2Go, which would seek to replicate as
closely as possible an individual’s current residential situation in a new
metropolitan area,244 could also be subject to disparate impact analysis if it
tended to have a segregative effect. Here, the nondiscriminatory rationale
would be that of facilitating relocation into areas that match one’s current
location—a way of “not moving” (or not moving as much) when one
moves. After all, continuing to live in a segregated neighborhood also
entrenches segregation, but there are compelling nondiscriminatory reasons
that people might wish to stay where they are. These interests are attenuated
when one seeks to replicate one’s current environment elsewhere, however.
A less discriminatory approach might permit matching only on factors other
than racial composition, or adding some degree of randomization along that
dimension and others that closely correlate with it.245
Although debate continues over disparate impact, the persistence of
homeseeker discrimination establishes its potential utility in countering the
effects of ongoing, intentional racial discrimination in the housing domain.
The search gap is by no means the only justification for recognizing a
disparate impact cause of action, nor the only source of misalignment
between fair housing rights and currently recognized intent-based duties.
242
See Inclusive Communities, 135 S.Ct. at 2511, 2522-23; 24 C.F.R. 100.500. The precise formulation of
the disparate impact test under the FHA remains open to question. See, e.g., Robert G. Schwemm, Fair Housing
Litigation After Inclusive Communities: What's New and What's Not, 115 COLUMBIA L. REV. SIDEBAR 106, 121
(September 2015) (noting minor wording differences between HUD’s disparate impact rule and the Court’s
statements about disparate impact in Inclusive Communities).
243
It is noteworthy that such an approach would appear to interfere relatively little with the broad run of
African-American neighborhood composition preferences while having much more bite in addressing white racial
composition preferences. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing empirical evidence of
asymmetric preferences for neighborhood composition).
244
See supra note 57, and accompanying text.
245
See infra notes 266-270 and accompanying text.
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Many forms of past and ongoing discrimination that cannot be reached by
law can interact with neutral policies to constrain housing options “because
of race.”246 Nonetheless, the search gap is an especially interesting place to
focus attention when considering the footing of disparate impact as a costshifting mechanism. It shows that some of the work that disparate impact
analysis might do is not about fixing obscure problems far back in the
causal chain, but rather about addressing here-and-now intentional racial
discrimination that we cannot or will not tackle head-on.247
C. Affirmatively Furthering
The Fair Housing Act obligates HUD to “administer the programs and
activities relating to housing and urban development in a manner
affirmatively to further the policies of [the Act].”248 In a July 2015 final
rule, HUD defined “affirmatively further” as “taking meaningful actions, in
addition to combating discrimination, that overcome patterns of segregation
and foster inclusive communities free from barriers that restrict access to
opportunity based on protected characteristics.”249 Under this rule, grant
recipients such as local governments and public housing authorities must
submit, at five year intervals, an Assessment of Fair Housing that
documents current housing patterns, sets goals to improve them, and details
impediments and plans for overcoming them.
HUD does not mandate any particular outcomes or set any benchmarks,
however, much less specify sanctions for failing to do so.250 Nonetheless,
246
For discussion of the meaning of “because of race” as it relates to disparate impact, see Noah D. Zatz,
The Many Meanings of “Because of”: A Comment on Inclusive Communities Project, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE
68 (2015); Lee Anne Fennell, Because and Effect: Another Take on Inclusive Communities, 68 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 85 (2016).
247
Cf. Alan Wertheimer, Reflections on Discrimination, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 945, 958 (2006) (“Precisely
because society decides to allow racially biased mating choices, it may also acquire a responsibility to remedy or
soften the harmful social consequences of such choices.”). Another way to put the point in the text is to say that
the legitimacy of granting broad decisional authority to individual households in the home selection domain is
contingent on other societal efforts that ensure its cumulative exercise will not unduly damage the interests of
other households. Thus, a normative commitment to decisional privacy might justify shifting the burden of
delivering fair housing opportunities, but would not justify ignoring the obligation altogether. See Hanoch Dagan
& Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1428 (2016) (observing that one way to address
conflicts between the demands of relational justice and other commitments of the state is “to restrict individual
responsibility by shifting some of the burden onto public law, thereby preventing or limiting the conflict with
distributive or democratic commitments”).
248
42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5). Another provision mandates cooperation by other executive departments and
agencies in affirmatively furthering the purposes of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d).
249
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, Final
Rule, 80 FED. REG. 42271 (July 16, 2015). In the past, HUD required local governments, housing authorities, and
other grant recipients to create an “Analysis of Impediments” to Fair Housing. This document “was generally not
submitted to or reviewed by HUD,” however, and was found to be “not as effective as originally envisioned.” Id.
at 42272. See also Rigel Oliveri, Beyond Disparate Impact: How the Fair Housing Movement Can Move On, 54
WASHBURN L.J. 625, 642-43 (2015) (discussing HUD’s history of neglecting the affirmatively further mandate
and citing the 2006 Westchester County litigation as turning point).
250
Rather, the rule requires that those whom it funds chart their own progress, set benchmarks, and identify
obstacles and ways of overcoming them. See 80 FED. REG. 42272, 42286-87 (describing comments on this issue
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HUD’s new emphasis on the affirmatively further mandate encourages
efforts to overcome patterns associated with presumptively unreachable
forms of conduct. Below, I consider some strategies that change the mix of
information available to searchers, innovate in other ways within the search
space, or change what is at stake when homeseekers make housing
decisions.
1. Information Strategies
Information-based strategies can alter the search environment by either
adding or subtracting information.251 The former category includes efforts
to address homebuyer search heuristics through affirmative marketing. In
Steptoe v. Beverly Area Planning Association, for example, a nonprofit
community organization, the Beverly Area Planning Association (BAPA)
provided information to househunters who were interested in making
“nontraditional moves.”252 Beverly, an historically predominantly white
neighborhood on the far southwest side of Chicago, had become integrated,
and BAPA was concerned about maintaining that integration against
resegregation.253 To that end, it provided bifurcated housing advice,
informing white homeseekers about housing opportunities within the
integrated Beverly neighborhood, but directing black homeseekers to
predominantly white areas in the neighboring suburbs.254
The court upheld BAPA’s selective provision of information against
FHA and § 1982 challenges. It found that BAPA did not control access to
housing, held no monopoly on housing information, and disclosed to
homeseekers the selective nature of the information that it would provide.255
BAPA was thus deemed to be merely providing extra information about
integrative moves to those who sought it out.256
Affirmative marketing efforts were likewise upheld in another Chicagoarea case, South-Suburban Housing Center v. Board of Realtors.257 There,
the South-Suburban Housing Center (SSHC) made extra efforts to interest
white homebuyers in homes that it had bought in an area of Park Forest that
had become known as a “black block.”258 The court held that this did not
and providing a response).
251
In other words, as Lior Strahilevitz puts it, law can employ “search lights” or “curtains.” Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667,
1711-13 (2008) (explaining how law can use search lights and curtains, in addition to carrots and sticks, and
highlighting the way that the former two strategies might be used in the antidiscrimination context); see also
STRAHILEVITZ, supra note 136, at 157-72.
252
674 F.Supp 1313 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
253
See Steptoe, 674 F.Supp. at 1315.
254
Id. at 1316.
255
Id. at 1319-20.
256
Id.
257
935 F.2d 868 (1991).
258
Id. at 873. The purchases of the homes by SSHC followed a wave of foreclosures and blight in the
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violate the Fair Housing Act, because black homebuyers were not dissuaded
or misinformed about the opportunities.259 Although the court noted that
any steering based on a customer’s race would be impermissible, it held that
“[i]n the absence of concrete evidence of this nature . . . we see nothing
wrong with SSHC attempting to attract white persons to housing
opportunities they might not ordinarily know about and thus choose to
pursue.”260
As in Steptoe, the information provided by SSHC was deemed to be
purely additive, and offered in support of one of the Fair Housing Act’s
goals: integration.261 Neither group’s provision of extra information would
be necessary or useful if home search decisions were already being made in
a race-neutral way. In both cases, the need to counter existing race-based
decision patterns provided the impetus and the justification. Nonetheless,
selectively channeling information about neighborhood opportunities to
white homeseekers is a less normatively attractive way to address biased
search than finding race-neutral mechanisms to disrupt established search
heuristics. Below, I will consider some ways that emerging technologies
might support such alternatives.
The opposite strategy—that of removing information—has also been
attempted by communities, primarily in the context of attempting to arrest
“white flight.” As Schelling’s analysis suggests, housing decisions can
produce cascades; thus, shielding some moves from view could keep other
moves from occurring at all. Starting in the 1970’s, a number of
communities experimented with limits on “for sale” signs, in an effort to
arrest a destructive dynamic in which knowledge of sales sets off more
sales. There are important constitutional limits on this approach, however,
and in Linmark v. Township of Willingboro, the Supreme Court struck down
such a sign ban on First Amendment grounds.262 Yet such bans still exist in
some communities, even if only enforced through social norms.263
neighborhood. Id.
259
Id. at 884.
260
Id.
261
See id.
262
431 U.S. 85 (1977). In his opinion for the Court, Justice Marshall observed that an alternative to
prohibiting “for sale” signs would be for white homeowners to send a competing message with “not for sale”
signs. Id. at 97. For a discussion of the use and effects of “not for sale” signs, including their potential to
unwittingly telegraph that racial transition is underway, see RICHARD R. BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE
NEIGHBORHOOD 193-202 (2013).
263
For example, Oak Park has kept sign bans on the books, but does not enforce them through the law. See
Oak Park Village Code 13-2-3 (banning for sale and for rent signs, with exceptions for new construction or
conversions) http://sterlingcodifiers.com/codebook/index.php?book_id=459&chapter_id=20381#s932047; id. 132-3.1 (allowing open house signs on Sundays only for periods of four hours or less)
http://sterlingcodifiers.com/codebook/index.php?book_id=459&chapter_id=20381#s932048; Steven Jackson, Not
in Your Front Yard: Why ‘For Sale’ Signs are Banned in Oak Park, WBEZ, Curious City, March 21, 2016,
https://www.wbez.org/shows/curious-city/not-in-your-front-yard-why-for-sale-signs-are-banned-in-oakpark/5d93f1e7-8540-495c-bbca-6bc7a4430702/ (discussing Oak Park’s informal enforcement mechanisms,
including “a long-standing agreement” with local real estate agents).
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Today’s information-rich environment provides many more ways to
access information about homes for sale, but there may still be something
viscerally significant and especially salient about physical signs. For one
thing, homeowners who have no thought of moving are unlikely to be
actively monitoring online real estate listings, but they can hardly avoid
noticing a fresh crop of “for sale” signs as they drive through the
neighborhood. For the very same reason, banning signs represents an
infringement on the ordinary workings of the market. As a seller, one might
wish to capture the attention not only of potential buyers who are actively
searching for listings, but also those who might be willing to consider a
move to the right property. Nonetheless, the sign ban arguably solved a
collective action problem for residents that may have left even the sellers
better off on balance than if it did not exist.
Even if this sort of information suppression could keep existing
integrated neighborhoods from resegregating, it would do little to address
existing segregation. Other forms of information suppression, such as
hiding demographic data, might be expected to do more harm than good.
At the same time, there might be room to encourage data aggregation and
use tools that shield some forms of information from view while
highlighting others.264 Another alternative is to raise the (implicit or
explicit) price of obtaining certain kinds of information, or to subsidize
choices made in the absence of that information. Some possibilities along
these lines are discussed next.
2. Innovating in the Search Space
Although past information strategies offer some doctrinal guideposts,
the affirmatively further mandate offers an opportunity for communities to
pursue innovative new strategies in the search space—ones that might be
capable of shaking up existing patterns and reducing reliance on racial
proxies. At a meta-level, the best way to proceed may be to find ways to
incentivize integrative innovations in search technologies. Social impact
bonds offer one tool for harnessing results-oriented policy ideas.265 These
bonds make payoffs contingent on a grantee’s ability to deliver measurable
results along a particular, verifiable metric—which here might mean
reducing certain measures of segregation and achieving particular
264

See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 251, at 1711-13.
See, e.g., ANDREW PALMER, SMART MONEY 89-112 (2015); J.B. Wogan, Can Social Impact Bonds Help
Reduce Homelessness? GOVERNING, Sept. 8, 2015, http://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-social-impactbonds-help-santa-clara-county-reduce-homelessness.html; Ronnie Horesh, Injecting Incentives Into the Solution of
Social Problems: Social Policy Bonds 20(3) ECON. AFFAIRS (2000); Hanna Azemati et al., Social Impact Bonds:
Lessons Learned So Far, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT REV. (April 2013),
http://www.frbsf.org/community-development/publications/community-development-investmentreview/2013/april/social-impact-bonds-lessons-learned/ .
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affirmative indicia of successful integration.
Because housing patterns depend on complex interdependent patterns of
behavior, there is a primary role for fostering new search norms and for
developing new focal strategies to guide search. Apps and interactive tools
might do this in a variety of ways at a variety of scales. Consider, for
example, the possibility that a community could develop and popularize a
free pro-integration housing search tool. Such an interface could build on a
variety of the strategies discussed above, whether by suppressing certain
kinds of information, highlighting others, or simply introducing a certain
amount of random perturbation into the results that it delivers.
Economists have used the notion of “simulated annealing” to capture
the sorts of random mutations that may enable moves to higher valued
equilibria.266 In the present context, introducing noise into search could
prompt changes that would ultimately catalyze larger shifts from selfreinforcing housing patterns.267 Recent work on algorithms has similarly
suggested that introducing randomness might help to break down past
patterns infected by discrimination and avoid replicating disparities.268 For
example, Joshua Kroll and his coauthors have suggested that a hiring
algorithm might be set up to hire some candidates who fail to meet existing
predictive criteria—and then track their performance to allow the algorithm
to learn.269 In the housing context, a user might be prompted to input
neighborhoods that she knows she would like to search within, and the app
might automatically blend the results with those from similar
neighborhoods with which she might be less familiar.270
Certain search tools might even enable a kind of “blind booking” model
with respect to setting up appointments to see residential units.271 Such an
approach could allow the user to set detailed parameters about commuting
266
See Ken Kollman, John Miller, & Scott Page, Political Institutions and Sorting in a Tiebout Model, 87
AM ECON REV. 977, 989 (1997) (“A minor mistake . . . can dislodge the system from a relatively bad local
optimum, and induce agents to re-sort themselves into a better configuration.”).
267
See Richard R.W. Brooks, The Banality of Racial Inequality (reviewing ROITHMAYR, supra note 5), 124
YALE L.J. 2626, 2655-61 (2015) (discussing Roithmayr’s use of the Polya urn model to illustrate path dependence
and explaining how introducing random variation into the urn-filling operation could break the pattern).
268
See Kroll et al. supra note 60 at 12-14, 35-36; see also Chander, supra note 60, at 15-19 (discussing the
use of “algorithmic affirmative action” to address discriminatory results).
269
Kroll, supra note 60 at 36 (“By occasionally guessing about candidates for which the model cannot make
confident predictions, the model can gather additional data and evolve to become more faithful to the real
world.”).
270
Cf. Eillie Anzilotti, This Mapping App Is Designed for Urban Wanderers, Atlantic CityLab, Feb. 23,
2016
http://www.citylab.com/navigator/2016/02/this-app-will-turn-you-into-an-urban-wanderer/470577/
(describing the Likeways wayfinding app that claims to consciously build in serendipity and take users by less
traveled paths).
271
Under these models, consumers commit to a particular expenditure, such as for a hotel or a flight, before
learning exactly where they will be going or what they will be getting. See, e.g., Susan Stellin, Taking Some
Mystery Out of Blind Booking, N.Y. TIMES, March 28, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/31/travel/takingsome-mystery-out-of-blind-booking.html?_r=0 ; Scott McCartney, The Best Airline Bargains, If You Have a Taste
for Adventure, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-best-airline-bargains-if-you-have-ataste-for-adventure-1441214282
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times from employment and school locations, the specifics of the housing
unit itself, and the non-protected characteristics of neighbors. Apps and
search tools might also make use of certain kinds of information and not
others, or require a separate “unmasking” step to consciously gain certain
pieces of data about racial composition or the racial identity of
counterparties (such as might be derived from pictures).272 It could become
an act of social consciousness to choose search tools and settings that mask
information that could, even unconsciously, lead to biased actions.273
While this family of approaches wouldn’t be of interest to every
homeseeker, tools for debiasing search could soften preconceived ideas
about how one goes about finding a residence and change norms
surrounding the search process.274 By incentivizing the use of search
technologies that consciously embed surprising results, law and policy
could take a more active role in disrupting segregated housing patterns.
3. Changing Stakes
If property value concerns are a significant driver of race-based
homeseeking, then one approach might be to lower the stakes associated
with property value changes. Ingrid Gould Ellen observes that prohomeownership policies may entrench segregation, since data shows that
homeowners are more sensitive than renters to racial composition.275 Thus,
272
See, e.g., Chander, supra note 60, at 17-18 (noting that in Uber’s platform design “drivers do not see a
photo of the passenger until after the driver has accepted the fare” so that it would require a separate step to cancel
the fare, producing a negative mark against the driver). Similarly, Airbnb has recently announced changes aimed
at countering discrimination on its platform, including reducing the emphasis placed on profile photos -- although
it is unclear how this de-emphasis will be implemented or whether it will meaningfully reduce bias. See Katie
Benner, Airbnb Adopts Rules to Fight Discrimination by Its Hosts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2016. The potential for
racially identifiable information to generate biased results has been documented in a number of studies. See
Edelman & Luca, supra note 182 (finding racial discrimination against Airbnb landlords based on profile photos);
Jennifer L. Doleac & Luke C.D. Stein, The Visible Hand: Race and Online Market Outcomes, 123 ECON. J. F469
(2013) (finding racial discrimination in online sale of iPods based on hands visible in the image); see also
Benjamin Edelman, Michael Luca, & Dan Svirsky, Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy, unpublished
manuscript (2016), available at http://www.benedelman.org/publications/airbnb-guest-discrimination-2015-1209.pdf (finding that Airbnb guests with distinctively African-American names had their requests rejected more
often than guests with distinctively white names).
273
See EVIATAR ZERUBAVEL, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT 59-60 (2015) (discussing attentional norms including
“norms of disattention” that involve conscious aversion of one’s gaze in certain settings and “attentional taboos”
that call for avoidance of certain types of information in decisionmaking). In addition to masking information
about others from one’s own view in order to reduce the risk of unconscious bias, norms might develop around
suppressing information about oneself that could produce bias – even in one’s own favor. For example, one
Airbnb user reported replacing her profile photo with a photo of a landscape in order to reduce bias against her.
Shankar Vedantam, #AirbnbWhileBlack: How Hidden Bias Shapes the Sharing Economy, Hidden Brain, NPR,
Apr. 26, 2016, available at http://www.npr.org/2016/04/26/475623339/-airbnbwhileblack-how-hidden-biasshapes-the-sharing-economy. If large numbers of socially conscious Airbnb users did likewise, whether or not
they anticipated being discriminated against, the lack of a personal photo would not convey any information about
protected characteristics but would instead simply make a statement against discrimination.
274
See supra note 230.
275
ELLEN, supra note 6 at 176; see also Freeman & Cai, supra note 7, at 313 (finding a “negative
relationship between the homeownership rate and white invasion [of black neighborhoods]” and suggesting that
this “is consistent with Ellen’s (2000) argument that white renters will be more comfortable taking the risk of
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a very basic move to support integration would be to alter the law’s relative
treatment of different tenure forms. Significantly, § 3608(d) of the Fair
Housing Act requires all federal agencies to cooperate with HUD in
affirmatively furthering fair housing. One way to do so would be to cut
back on tax subsidies for homeownership. 276
Another stake-lowering approach might be to encourage rent-to-own
alternatives. Not only does the available evidence indicate that homebuyers
are more sensitive to neighborhood racial composition than renters, it also
establishes that the moving-in decision is more sensitive to neighborhood
racial composition than the moving-out decision.277 These two facts
considered in tandem suggest that considerable leverage might be provided
by a try-it-before-you-buy-it approach to location decisions.278 While rentto-own is not a commonly available alternative presently, there is no reason
why it could not be encouraged, through tax policy or otherwise, as part of
the mission of affirmatively furthering fair housing.
Home equity insurance offers another possibility, one that has been
written about extensively and attempted in at least a few communities.279
moving into black neighborhoods because they have less at stake than owners.”).
276
There have been many calls to end the mortgage interest tax deduction, although such proposals are
usually spurred by concerns about housing consumption distortions or distributive effects. For a recent review of
the literature and discussion of some potentially offsetting effects on location choices, see David Albuoy &
Andrew Hanson, Are Houses Too Big or In the Wrong Place? Tax Benefits to Housing and Inefficiencies in
Location and Consumption, 28 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 63 (NBER 2014), available at
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c13054. There have also been some proposals to restrict the mortgage interest
deduction to incentivize certain housing goals, including integration. See, e.g., NATALIE MOORE, THE SOUTH SIDE
32 (2016) (recounting Dorothy Brown’s suggestion that the mortgage interest deduction be eliminated in
neighborhoods that are not at least ten percent African American); JAMES W. LOEWEN, SUNDOWN TOWNS: A
HIDDEN DIMENSION OF AMERICAN RACISM 443–45 (2005) (proposing that residents of segregated white towns be
made ineligible for the mortgage interest deduction); Boger, supra note 3, at 1606-10 (proposing phase-outs of the
mortgage interest deduction and property tax deduction for residents of communities that have failed to meet
certain “fair share” housing targets). By applying penalties at the community level, however, these proposals run
the risk of imposing costs not just on excluders but also on those who have overcome their exclusionary tactics, or
who would wish to do so in the future. See Lee Anne Fennell, Properties of Concentration, 73 U CHI. L. REV.
1227, 1273 n.154 (2006).
277
See supra note 24.
278
The efficacy of this approach depends on the reason for the difference between the moving in and the
moving out decisions. Ellen has posited that the difference can be attributed to the fact that residents have more
knowledge about the neighborhood, and hence less need to rely on racial stereotypes. See ELLEN, supra note 6, at
106. But as discussed above, if the racial proxy is widely used by homeseekers, it will remain an important input
into home values – something we might expect to capture the attention of homeowners. See generally WILLIAM
A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS (2001). An alternative or supplemental explanation would be that,
having already invested in the home, homeowners do not wish to realize a loss and hence tend to stay the
course—whether rationally or not. See, e.g., David Genesove & Christopher Mayer, Loss Aversion and Seller
Behavior: Evidence from the Housing Market, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1233 (2001); Stephen Day Cauley & Andrey D.
Pavlov, Rational Delays: The Case of Real Estate, 24 J. REAL ESTATE FIN. & ECON. 143 (2002). If this
explanation is doing most of the work, then a rent-to-own approach might not be very helpful. For very shortterm versions of the try-before-you-buy model, see infra note 291.
279
See, e.g., ELLEN supra note 6, at 163, 172-72; William A. Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a
Cure for Its Exclusionary Effects, 41 URBAN STUD. 317, 335 (2004); Adam Yarmolinsky, Reassuring the Small
Homeowner, 22 PUB. INTEREST 106, 106 (Winter 1971); Maureen A. McNamara, The Legality and Efficacy of
Homeowner’s Equity Assurance: A Study of Oak Park, Illinois, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1463, 1468–69 (1984);
Matityahu Marcus and Michael K. Taussig, A Proposal for Government Insurance of Home Values against
Locational Risks, 46 LAND ECON. 404, 408–12 (1970).
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Here, the idea is to allow homeowners to offload some of the risk of
property value decline to investors or insurers in the hope of reducing
sensitivity to changes in the local area. Although typically raised in the
context of stemming white flight or addressing NIMBYism, it could also
support more integrative move-in decisions. White in-movers may avoid
areas with relatively small minority populations if they fear that a dynamic
process is underway that will transform the neighborhood into a largely
minority one. Insuring against declines in home value that are not
attributable to the homeowner’s own decisions on her parcel could ease this
fear.
Among the critiques of this approach is the idea that it is offensive to
insure against racial change.280 But a broad-based realigning of
homeownership risk could also protect homeowners against many potential
sources of home value change unrelated to neighborhood composition.281
While I will not repeat here the arguments in favor of and against offering a
reduced-risk version of homeownership, it should be noted that this
represents one possible way of beginning to address the search gap—and
one that would do so without limiting homeseeker choice. Here too, tax
policy could play a primary role in encouraging more integration-friendly
forms of tenure.
Explicit subsidies to encourage integrative moves represent another set
of approaches; they lower the stakes by simply reducing the entry price.
One version of this idea, a low-interest mortgage available only to
households for whom a move will be pro-integrative, has been the subject
of some past experimentation and analysis.282 The approach, as usually
conceived, takes explicit account of race: although the program is open to
homebuyers of all races, whether a particular buyer will receive a
280

See ELLEN supra note 6, at 173.
See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047 (2008) (discussing such
a broad-based approach as well as other past and proposed risk-reduction models).
282
See, e.g., ELLEN, supra note 6, at 168-69 (discussing several such programs and citing related literature);
Suja Thomas, Efforts to Integrate Housing: The Legality of Mortgage-Incentive Programs, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 940
(1991) (describing pro-integration mortgage programs adopted in Ohio and Wisconsin and analyzing the legality
of such programs); National Housing Institute, The Value of Integration, SHELTERFORCE ONLINE (March/April
2001) available at http://www.shelterforce.com/online/issues/116/PRISM.html (describing the South
Orange/Maplewood [New Jersey] Community Coalition on Race’s Pro-Integrative Supplemental Money (PRISM)
program, which offers below market loans to homebuyers entering “an area in which they are racially underrepresented”); W. DENNIS KEATING, THE SUBURBAN RACIAL DILEMMA 202-10 (1994) (discussing pro-integrative
mortgage incentive programs and the results of a study evaluating four of the programs in Cuyahoga County),;
Mittie Olion Chandler, Obstacles to Housing Integration Program Efforts, in THE METROPOLIS IN BLACK AND
WHITE 286, 292-97 (George C. Galster & Edward W. Hill, eds., 1992) (providing a case study of Ohio’s program
and describing other similar efforts); Howard Husock, “Integration Incentives” in Suburban Cleveland, Kennedy
School of Government Case No. C16-89-877.0 (1989), available at http://case.hks.harvard.edu/integrationincentives-in-suburban-cleveland/ (providing a detailed case study of Ohio’s program in suburban Cleveland);
Brian A. Cromwell, Prointegrative Subsidies and Their Effect on Housing Markets: Do Race-Based Loans
Work?, Cleveland Federal Reserve Bank Working Paper No. 9018 (1990), available at
https://www.clevelandfed.org/en/newsroom-and-events/publications/working-papers/working-papersarchives/1990-working-papers/wp-9018-prointegrative-subsidies-and-their-effect-on-housing-markets-do-racebased-loans-work.aspx (analyzing the impact of Ohio’s mortgage program in Shaker Heights).
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subsidized mortgage for particular home will depend on the race of that
buyer and the racial composition of the neighborhood in which the home is
located.283 Despite one favorable Attorney General opinion,284 such a raceconscious approach could raise constitutional and statutory red flags.285
One alternative might be to define a pro-integrative move so that it
depends not on the buyer’s race, but rather her previous residence: a buyer
could qualify for a low-cost mortgage if a race that was significantly
underrepresented in her old neighborhood has significantly greater
representation in her new neighborhood.286 A program using these criteria
would serve the race-neutral goal of shaking up established search patterns
and encouraging people of all races to experiment with living in
neighborhoods that are significantly different from the ones to which they
have become accustomed.287 Such an approach might be coupled with
283
Defining what counts as pro-integrative is a primary design challenge. Programs must select benchmarks
such as the overall composition of a city or metropolitan area, and then determine how far from those benchmarks
qualifying communities must be in order for households moving into them to collect subsidies for progress toward
those benchmarks. See Thomas, supra note 282, at 944-52 (describing the program details of the Ohio Housing
Finance Agency’s prointegration mortgage assistance program, Wisconsin’s Alternative Financing for Opening
Residential Doors (AFFORD) program, and a hypothetical mortgage subsidy program the author constructed for
purposes of conducting legal analysis).
284
Ohio Attorney General Anthony J. Celebreeze, Jr., issued an opinion in 1987 concluding the Ohio
Housing Finance Agency’s (OHFA) pro-integration loan program was a legally acceptable temporary measure to
advance the legitimate state goal of integration. Opinion No. 87-095, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 617, 623-30 (Dec. 14,
1987) (finding OHFA’s pro-integration mortgage program did not violate antidiscrimination law or the equal
protection clause in the U.S. or Ohio constitutions). Celebreeze reached his conclusion on the constitutional issue
by applying rational basis review, based on his view that the loan program did not classify based on race, but
rather only on one’s attitude toward integration. Id. at 629-30; but see Thomas, supra note 282, at 964-65
(suggesting Celebreeze improperly applied rational basis review).
285
Analysis of these legal issues is beyond the scope of this piece, but would likely focus on whether the
pro-integration goal and availability to all would be sufficient to overcome the race-consciousness baked into the
program. Thomas, supra note 282, is the most extensive legal analysis of the issue of which I am aware. While
she concludes that a well-designed program could survive statutory and constitutional challenges, see id. at 96178, her analysis hinges on a court’s willingness to apply intermediate scrutiny to the program, as well as on a
certain degree of openness to race-based remedies. Notably, all of the research that I could locate on integrative
mortgage subsidies is now decades old and cannot account for more recent legal developments involving racebased remedies.
286
Definitional question abound (e.g., how much underrepresentation is required in the old neighborhood,
and how much greater must the representation be in the new neighborhood?) but should be no more difficult to
address in this context than under programs that explicitly rely on the race of the purchaser. To prevent gaming,
homebuyers might be required to identify a past residence at which they had lived, say, two of the last five years,
with multiple past residences aggregated in some fashion if necessary. To avoid cascades producing resegregation,
the receiving neighborhood’s composition could be assessed in a manner that would take account of other people
currently in the process of purchasing homes there, and neighborhoods could be removed from the program once
certain integration targets were reached or if turnover rates exceeded particular levels.
287
Entrenched segregation produces a high degree of correlation between the race of buyers and the racial
composition of their prior neighborhoods, but this would not make the program a race-based one if its impetus and
justification were found in increasing exposure to more diverse environments. The fact that certain racial groups
would qualify at greater rates for subsidized loans to move into particular neighborhoods (while other racial
groups would qualify at greater rates for moves to different neighborhoods) would be unlikely to translate into a
successful disparate impact claim, given the important governmental purpose of integration being advanced.
However, disparate impact analysis could inform and shape the program details to ensure that low-cost loans are
not, in the aggregate, disproportionately flowing to one racial group rather than another. This has been a concern
with past pro-integrative mortgage programs. See, e.g., Chandler, supra note 282, at 294 (noting opposition to the
Ohio program from a number of organizations alleging that choice was being limited for black buyers while
benefits flowed primarily to white buyers).
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additional community-level subsidies, granted annually, to residents in
neighborhoods that achieve and maintain a certain level of integration.288
Giving everyone in the community a stake in integration could provide a
valuable assist to other affirmative marketing and informational strategies
by encouraging a wider dispersal of information about available units.
Some of the highest stakes for homeseekers may be nonfinancial in
nature. White families with children appear more sensitive to neighborhood
racial composition than do those without children.289 To the extent this
pattern is driven by concerns about schools, in-kind subsidies to those in
locating in integrated neighborhoods might take the form of priority in
school choice plans.290 More broadly, finding ways to encourage temporary
entry into unfamiliar communities could spur valuable learning. Here, it is
interesting to consider the ways in which new business models like Airbnb
have enabled people to gain familiarity with neighborhoods in a low-stakes
way.291 Well-designed adaptations could enable families to gain first-hand
familiarity with different areas within a city.
Of course, any of these approaches would introduce difficult design
issues. My point here is not to advocate for any particular policy but rather
to suggest the need for, and potential traction of, creative thinking around
the issue of housing search.
CONCLUSION
Our fair housing laws express a normative commitment: that race will
not influence the housing opportunities that one receives, and that one’s life
chances will not be arbitrarily limited by residential racial segregation.
Recent events have shown a renewed willingness to deliver on that promise.
288
Combining strategies could avoid any perceived unfairness associated with granting subsidies to people
coming from initially segregated environments, and also remove perverse incentives to alter one’s neighborhood
environment to qualify residents for mortgage subsidies for future moves.
289
See, e.g., ELLEN supra note 6, at 127-28, 142, 154; Emerson et al., supra note 59, at 930.
290
For an interesting proposal along these lines, see A. Mechele Dickerson, Book Review, Caught in the
Trap: Pricing Racial Housing Preferences, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1273 (2005) (reviewing ELIZABETH WARREN AND
AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP 2003).
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See, e.g., David Roberts, Our Year of Living Airbnb, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2015
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/29/realestate/our-year-of-living-airbnb.html?_r=0 (chronicling a year of living
for one-month stretches in a series of Airbnb rentals throughout New York in an effort to gain more familiarity
with various neighborhoods); Lee Chilcote, How One Couple Turned A “Toxic Corner” of Cleveland Into a
Development Hotbed, Vanity Fair, Sept. 30, 2015, http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2015/09/hingetownneighborhood-cleveland (describing a couple’s redevelopment efforts in an area of Cleveland they dubbed
“Hingetown,” “including a full-time Airbnb unit they use to show off the neighborhood”). Perhaps recognizing
this potential, Airbnb launched a “live like a local” partnership with Realtor.com in 2015 to enable people to live
in neighborhoods they were considering purchasing in. See Airbnb, Realtor.com Team Up, DAILY REAL ESTATE
NEWS, June 24, 2015, http://realtormag.realtor.org/daily-news/2015/06/24/airbnb-realtorcom-team-up. Although it
is unclear if this feature is still in operation or what its level of success may have been, a more recent initiative,
Realstir, offers a platform through which homesellers can make their properties available to potential buyers on a
trial basis. See Realstir, Want to Learn More About Try Before You Buy? https://www.realstir.com/tbybcenter.php.
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In Inclusive Communities, the Supreme Court not only recognized a
disparate impact cause of action in the Fair Housing Act, but also
reaffirmed that integration remains a continuing goal of the Act. With a
new final rule, HUD has taken concerted action to pour more content into
the Fair Housing Act’s affirmatively further mandate. The time is ripe to
consider what the future of fair housing should look like. That future, I
suggest, should include more careful attention to housing search.
Homeseeking bias currently interposes a gap between the rights that fair
housing law aspires to extend to all households and the liability that it
generates for actors who interfere with those rights. Because biased search
represents a form of intentional discrimination that can powerfully entrench
segregation, leaving it unredressed requires some justification. Ignoring
search means shifting costs somewhere else—either to those who lose out
as a result of these cumulative search patterns, or to some other actors that
the law will hold to account.
This paper presents a two-pronged approach to the search gap. First, we
should not accept at face value the conventional view that the conduct of
homeseekers is untouchable. While there are good normative reasons to
avoid intruding into the ultimate decisions that homeseekers make, this does
not mean that all facets of homeseeking should be exempted from scrutiny.
Second, to the extent that we cannot or will not reach discriminatory
homeseeking, the gap that it produces requires something more of other
actors than the bare duty not to intentionally discriminate. Both the
disparate impact cause of action and the affirmatively further mandate
provide legal hooks for shifting the costs associated with biased search onto
parties who are in a position to bear or mitigate those costs.
Discriminatory search is, of course, only one source of the overall rightduty gap found in fair housing. This paper’s deep conceptual and doctrinal
dive into search has necessarily left unaddressed many other contributors to
segregation and, more broadly, to social inequities associated with
residential patterns.292 The analysis here thus addresses only one piece of a
large and difficult puzzle—but it is an important piece, and one that should
no longer be neglected. Allowing the costs of biased homeseeking to fall
unabated on minority households and communities is not consistent with
the promise of fair housing. We must search for better alternatives.
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See, e.g., Tama Leventhal et al., Children in Neighborhoods, in HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY AND
DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE Ch. 13 (7th ed.) (Richard M. Lerner, ed., 2015) (reviewing the literature on links
between children’s neighborhood environments and life outcomes); Raj Chetty et al., The Effects of Exposure to
Better Neighborhoods on Children: New Evidence from the Moving to Opportunity Experiment, AM. ECON. REV.
(forthcoming 2016), available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/hendren/publications/effects-Exposure-BetterNeighborhoods-Children-New-Evidence-Moving-Opportunity.

